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HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS:
LITIGATION HAZARDS FOR HEALTH
INSURERS
E. Haavi Morreimt
INTRODUCTION
A.The Rise of HDHPs
Recent decades have witnessed enormous and ongoing change in
the American health care scene.' The "Artesian Well of Money",2 that
followed World War H--lavish funding that paid health care providers
virtually anything they asked, for virtually any service they rendered--
spawned roaring inflation in health care that, in turn, triggered a near-
violent reversal: managed care.3 Though temporarily successful in
1 Professor, College of Medicine, University of Tennessee Health Science
Center; B.A. 1972, St. Olaf College; M.A. 1976, Ph.D. 1980, University of Virginia.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the very helpful comments made on earlier
drafts by Thaddeus M. Pope, J.D., Ph.D., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, J.D., Peter Jacob-
son, J.D., M.P.H., Mark Hall, J.D., Marshall Kapp, J.D., M.P.H., Kristin Madison,
J.D., Ph.D.
1 For more extensive discussion of this history, see E. Haavi Morreim,
High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and Con-
tract, 59 VAND. L.REv. 1207, 1208-1217 (2006) (hereinafter Morreim, New Twists);
Richard L. Kaplan, Who's Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings
Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 McGEoRGE L. REV. 535, 545-
48 (2005).
2 E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20
Am. J.L. & Med. 79, 80 (1994).
3 As described by Prof. Rodwin:
Managed care refers to health insurance combined with ... controls over
the delivery of health services. Managed care organizations (MCOs) exer-
cise control over the kind, volume, and manner in which services are pro-
vided by choosing providers, or by controlling their behavior through finan-
cial incentives, rules, and organizational controls.
Under traditional indemnity insurance and fee-for-service medical practices,
the insurers enter into a contract with the insured party and reimburse the
individual for certain medical expenses that are incurred. The individual
receives medical services from any provider he or she chooses and usually
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restraining costs, harsh tactics4 earned a public enmity that eventuated
in attenuation, if not abdication, of the major techniques by which
costs were controlled.
If managed care began to fade, the cost of health care did not. In
2005, for the first time, the average premium for family health care
coverage in the United States reached the equivalent of a minimum-
wage worker's annual wage-- $10,880 versus $11,000, respectively.6
Spending that year increased nearly 7 percent,7 far ahead of general
inflation. Although that increase was somewhat smaller than the two
pays a fee for each service rendered, with the insurer having no control over
the choice of provider or provision of services
Managed care changes this relationship either (1) by directly providing the
contracted-for services; or (2) by exercising control over the services pro-
vided....
Many indemnity insurers now provide managed care in that they exercise
control over their beneficiaries' use of medical services. They require pre-
authorization for.., expensive referrals or procedures. They do not reim-
burse claims from medical providers for services rendered if the organiza-
tion decides they were not necessary.
Mark A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What are the Issues?,
26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1007, 1009 n.1 (1996).
The Texas Civil Practices and Remedies code defines a managed care entity as "any
entity which delivers, administers, or assumes risk for health care services with
systems or techniques to control or influence the quality, accessibility, utilization, or
costs and prices of such services to a defined enrollee population . TEx. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(8) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006).
4 These tactics included, inter alia, close utilization management with strin-
gent preauthorization requirements and ready denial of payment for services either
proposed or rendered, tight fee schedules or capitation arrangements for providers,
and gate-keeping arrangements requiring patients to visit their primary care physi-
cians to secure permission for specialist visits. Robert F. Rich & Christopher T. Erb,
The Two Faces of Managed Care Regulation & Policymaking, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 233, 236-37 (2005). Overall, managed care involved "(1) contractual arrange-
ments with selected providers to furnish a comprehensive set of health care services
to members; (2) significant financial incentives to direct patients to providers and
procedures within the plan; and (3) ongoing accountability of providers for their clini-
cal and financial performance through formal quality assurance and utilization re-
view." Id. at 236. See generally E. HAAVI MORREtM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE
ACCOUNTABLE: LAW AND THE NEW MEDICAL MARKETPLACE, 19-20, 60-61 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2001) (hereinafter MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE).
5 Thomas M. Burton, United Health to End Ruling on Treatments, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 9, 1999, at A-3; James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost
Sharing in Health Insurance Benefit Design, W2 HEALTH AFFAIRS W139, W143
(Mar. 20, 2002).
6 David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United
States--Origins and Implications, 355 New Engl. J. Med. 82, 85 (2006).
7 Aaron Catlin et a., National Health Spending in 2005: The Slowdown
Continues, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 142, 142 (2007).
2008] HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS: LITIGATION HAZARDS 3
prior years, health care spending nevertheless represented 16 percent
of the gross domestic product 8
Since many Americans receive health insurance through their em-
ployers,9 the business community is among the first to face rising
premiums, necessitating decisions about how much more expense
they can absorb, how much they must pass along to workers, and in-
deed whether they will continue to provide this benefit at all. Al-
though one option is to ask employees to share the increased cost of
premiums, many corporations are turning to an alternative: increased
cost-sharing at the time of service.10
Greater cost sharing became a more viable option with the Medi-
care Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).' This statute permits citi-
zens who have a high-deductible health plan (HDHP) for catastrophic
coverage--also known as a Consumer-Defined Health Plan (CDHP)--
to establish a tax-free health savings account (HSA). As of 2007, a
qualifying HDHP required a deductible12 of at least $1100 for an indi-
8 Id. See also Blumenthal, supra note 6, at 85.
9 In 2005, 59.5 percent of Americans received health care coverage from
their employers; down from 59.8 percent in 2004. Victoria Colliver, More in U.S.
Lack Health Insurance: Employers, Workers Feel Financial Pinch, U.S. Census Re-
ports, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 30, 2006, at A7.
10 Catlin, et al., supra note 7, at 149.
Current developments were foreshadowed by the recent past. From 1993
to 2004, workers' average deductible rose from $222 to $414 for an individual, and
from $495 to $861 for a family plan. Devon M. Herrick, Consumer Driven Health
Care: The Changing Role of the Patient, NAT'L CTR. POL'Y ANALYSIS, Rep. No. 276,
at 10 (May 2005), www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st276.
" Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469 (2003).
12 A "deductible" should be distinguished from related terms like "coinsur-
ance" and "copayment." James Robinson captures the differences well:
Conventional indemnity insurance imposed a deductible, which makes the
enrollee responsible for all costs up to a defined threshold, and then a coin-
surance rate, which makes the enrollee responsible for a percentage of costs
between the deductible threshold and an annual out-of-pocket maximum.
As insurers shifted their indemnity enrollment to PPO products to compete
with HMOs, they often restructured the cost sharing from coinsurance to
fixed-dollar copayments for office visits, hospital admissions, and other
services. Copayments offer enrollees the advantage of specifying in ad-
vance the amount for which they are responsible; the offer providers the
advantage of ease of collection (copayments typically are paid prior to ser-
vice, while coinsurance typically is paid afterward). ... Copayments suffer
from the salient limitation, as a cost-control instrument, of not varying ac-
cording to which physician or hospital is chosen, despite the often consider-
able differences among providers in rates charged to the insurance plan. In
contrast, percentage coinsurance provisions expose enrollees to at least part
of the financial consequences of their choice.
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vidual and $2200 for a family, with maximums reaching $5500 for
individuals and $10,500 for families.13 HSAs can then be used to pay
for medical expenses within the deductible as well as health-related
expenses not covered by insurance.'
4
The MMA amended the Internal Revenue Code,15 designating all
money placed into or earned in an HSA tax-free, so long as it is spent
on eligible health care expenses. Money spent on non-health care ex-
penses is subject to taxation and a 10 percent penalty, although that
penalty is removed for non-health care expenses if the individual is 65
or older.' 6 Since their inception, HDHPs with HSAs have gained con-
siderable acceptance, and are expected to become a standard feature
of the health insurance landscape.'
7
James C. Robinson, Renewed Emphasis on Consumer Cost Sharing in Health Insur-
ance Benefit Design, March 20, 2002, W-139, at 141-42.
13 I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(19), 106(d), 223(a)-(b), 3231(e)(11), 3306(b)(18) (West
2005). See also Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in
Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395-97 (2005); Kaplan,
supra note 1, at 548-559 (explaining MMA and its provisions). As of March 2005,
the average deductible for individuals was $2790 and for families was $5230. James
C. Robinson, Health Savings Accounts-The Ownership Society in Health Care, 353
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1199, 1200 (2005) (citation omitted).
14 HSAs are similar to, but more broadly available than three other options
permitting the use of tax-sheltered funds for health care. While the worker owns his
HSA funds, Health Reimbursement Accounts ("HRAs") are, and remain, the property
of the employer. Medical Savings Accounts, created by the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996, are largely identical to HSAs, but are only
available in limited settings. A Flexible Spending Account ("FSA") also enjoys tax
subsidies, but the employee must designate at the beginning of the year how much he
wants placed in his FSA, and at the end of the year, whatever he does not use, he will
lose. See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Insurance-Riding the Health Care
Tiger, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 195, 197 (2006); see DEVON M. HERRICK, NAT'L CTR
FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, BRIEF ANALYSIS No. 496, FLEXIBLE SPENDING AccouNTs:
MAKING A GOOD DEAL BETFER 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba496/; see also Morreim, New Twists, supra note 1, at
1213-14.
" I.R.C. § 223(f)(l)-(2), 223(f)(4)(A) (West 2005).
16 I.R.C. § 223(0(2), 223(f)(4)(A)-(C).
17 As of March 2005, total combined enrollment in HRAs and HSAs totaled
about 2.6 million. Robinson, supra note 13. The largest vendor was UnitedHealth
(865,000 members), followed by Aetna (370,000), and various Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plans (400,000). Id. (citations omitted). Much of the enrollment in HSAs is
from "outside the employment context." Id. Over the same time-frame, the average
deductible was $2790 for individuals and $5230 for families. Id.
The next year "there were 3.6 million HSA accounts at the end of 2006
with $5.1 billion in deposits, up from 1.1 million accounts with $1.2 billion in depos-
its at the end of 2005." Eileen A. Powell, New Rules over Health Savings Accounts
Making Them More Attractive, SuN-SENTnNEL, Mar. 28, 2007, available at
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/sfl-328healthsavings,0,2899909.story?coll=sfl-
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B.HDHP-Associated Litigation
Innovations in health plan design will doubtless inspire innova-
tions in litigation. As explored elsewhere, 18 physicians could face
several fairly distinctive litigation issues from HDHPs. This article, in
parallel, examines the litigation challenges that may arise specifically
for health plans. But the focus will be narrow. In the range of catas-
trophic coverage--the high-dollar claims exceeding the deductible
threshold--we can expect fairly familiar issues, such as whether the
insurer should cover costly new treatments.' 9 Rather than focus on
those, this article targets the issues that may crop up within the de-
ductible, where the patient is paying out of pocket or HSA. Although
it may seem odd to suppose health plans will be sued over decisions
patients pay for, a variety of challenging issues could arise.
Importantly, in any given year the great majority of people with
HDHPs will pay for all their health care out of pocket, or HSA. This
yourmoney.
Many employers have been eager to steer employees into these plans,
often via added financial incentives such as up-front coverage for preventive services,
and special drug coverage for people with chronic illnesses. Vanessa Fuhrmans,
Decoding New Health Plans: Despite Sky-High Deductibles, They Yield Savings-
Sometimes; Bargain-Hunting for Care, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2005, at BI; see also
Michael E. Chernew, Allison B. Rosen & A. Mark Fendrick, Value-Based Insurance
Design, 26 HEALTH AFF. W195, W197 (2007); see also HSAs Will Grow Significantly
in 2007 Despite Congressional Doubts, MARKET WIRE, Mar. 26, 2007,
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=719862&k=hsa; East Bay Bus. Times,
Survey: HSA Plan Enrollment Increases, SACRAMENTO Bus. J., April 2, 2007, avail-
able at
http://sacramento.bizjournals.com/sacramento/stories/2007/04/02/daily9.html?jst=b-
n.hl (highlighting the increased enrollment in high-deductible health plans in the
group insurance market).
18 See Morreim, New Twists, supra note I, at 1216-17.
19 During the 1990s, for instance, there was a plethora of claims that de-
manded insurers cover new treatments such as high-dose chemotherapy, with autolo-
gous bone marrow transplant or stem cell transplant for diseases such as advanced
breast cancer. See generally Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196
(1st Cir. 1997); Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998);
Harris v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, of Mo., 995 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Mut.
of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co, 18
F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994); Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958 (8th
Cir 1995); Bechtold v Physicians Health Plan, 19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1994); Dahl-
Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379 (1 1th Cir. 1993); Wilson v.
Office of Civilian Health & Med. Programs of the Uniformed Servs., 65 F.3d 361 (4th
Cir. 1995); Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 1997); Schwartz v.
FHP Int'l Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1996); Foster v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Mich., 969 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen
A. Brennan, The Controversy over High-Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone
Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 101.
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is because, while the great majority of health care dollars are spent on
relatively few people with catastrophic or chronic illnesses, the great
majority of people use relatively few resources in a given year. As of
the mid-1990s, "85% of Americans spen[t] less than $3000 a year on
medical care, and 73% ha[d] less than $500 a year in claims., 20 By
the same token, as of 1996, the top 10 percent of patients accounted
for nearly 70 percent of total health expenditures, while the top 30
percent consumed 90 percent of resources. This picture has remained
largely constant over several decades.2 '
This means that, for the first time in many years--perhaps ever 22--
large numbers of relatively affluent, well-educated people will di-
rectly pay significant amounts for their health care. Those with mod-
est health care needs will now be paying the entire tab, not just the
first few hundred dollars in a low deductible plan. They will not be
indifferent to the cost of care, as they might comfortably be where an
insurer is paying. Many will want to know, before they make health
care spending decisions, just how much the bill will be, and what they
can expect to get for their money.
This article explores anticipated litigation tussles between patients
and health insurers where it is the patient's, not the insurer's money,
directly at stake. Some issues will be explored only briefly, because
they will not differ significantly from familiar complaints that arise
20 Editorial, Consumer-First Health Care, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1994, at
A14.
21 Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care
Expenditures, Revisited, HEALTH AFT., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9, 12. Similarly, Luft
observed that 1 percent of the population consumes 30 percent of all medical care
costs, while the bottom 50 percent accounts for only 3 percent of expenditures. Har-
old S. Luft, Modifying Managed Competition to Address Cost and Quality, HEALTH
AFF., Spring 1996, at 23, 26 (citation omitted). One factor appears to have changed
since 1996, however. Health care spending has become somewhat more diffuse due
to the rapid growth in prescription drug spending, which has spread across much of
the population, while spending for inpatient care has slowed. By 2002 the top 1 per-
cent of patients accounted for 22 percent of spending, down 6 percent from the 1998
figure of 28 percent. Nevertheless, the top 5 percent of patients still accounted for
nearly half of all health care spending. See Samuel H. Zuvekas and Joel W. Cohen,
Prescription Drugs and the Changing Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, 26
HEALTH AFF. 249, 249-51 (2007).
22 Prior to the mid-twentieth century, medicine had relatively little to offer
patients. During and especially after World War II, the rapid rise and proliferation of
medical science and technology were accompanied by a commensurate expansion of
generous health insurance in the workplace and then, in 1965, to the elderly and indi-
gent via Medicare and Medicaid. Hence, in earlier times when most people paid out
of pocket, there was little to buy; when there was much to buy, most people enjoyed
ample third-party payment. See generally E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE
NEW MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICs 8-11 (1995).
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where the insurer pays, or refuses to pay, for care. Rather, this article
focuses on the more distinctive claims arising from cost-conscious
patients.
Part I sets the stage by outlining some of the new services many
plans now provide as they adapt to a more consumer-driven market-
place.
Part II examines several avenues for tort litigation. After briefly
reviewing familiar concepts of direct corporate liability in health care,
this article explores two plausibly emerging scenarios. The first line
of claims could spring from some of the new health advisory services
many HDHPs now offer, such as disease management and telephone
triage. Insurers that undertake to provide direct medical counseling
could be subject to traditional medical malpractice claims. Second is
potential liability for "economic informed consent" claims, because
patients now need to know about costs as a key side-effect of care.
Health plans could potentially incur liability either by interfering with
physicians' financial disclosures or by breaching new economic dis-
closure duties arguably owed by health plans themselves.
Part II discusses contract issues. First, many insurers are helping
enrollees keep track of their expenditures; indeed, some plans directly
manage enrollees' HSA funds. Where they do, accounting mishaps
could spawn contract quarrels. Second, some insurers, in an effort to
ensure that patients actually pay providers within this deductible
range, are establishing financing mechanisms that feature payroll de-
ductions. These mechanisms might adversely affect patients' ability
to contest the amounts and reasonableness of providers' charges.
Part IV explores a special area that may prove particularly inter-
esting. Patients paying out of pocket will want to know, not just the
immediate cost of a test or treatment, but whether and how much that
expenditure will count toward the deductible, bringing them closer to
the point where the health plan pays the bills. Health plans have an
incentive to count as little as possible, because the slower patients
meet the deductible threshold, the less the plan must pay. Cumula-
tively, health plans could save substantial sums. At the same time,
plans may be tempted to suppose they have little to fear from litiga-
tion. The amounts at stake--a few hundred dollars toward someone's
deductible--are individually so small that attorneys are unlikely to
accept these claims on a contingency basis, while patients may be
reluctant to pay more in attorney fees than the deductible itself is
worth. On the other hand, angry patients could directly file myriad
suits in small-claims courts and, if the denials on which those suits are
based exhibit a sinister pattern, class action could loom.
HEALTH MATRIX
As with any other discussion about litigation against health plans,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 23
is the proverbial "800-pound gorilla." Part V discusses which sorts of
claims ERISA likely will preempt, causing removal to federal courts,
with their limited panoply of claims for relief, and even more limited
remedies. It also shows how ERISA may force plans to produce at
least some kinds of information, such as determining, in advance,
whether and how much of a test or treatment will count toward the
deductible.
Finally, the conclusion discusses some practical realities of litiga-
tion in this realm.
Overall, this article argues that HDHPs can open a variety of
fairly distinctive avenues for litigation against health plans, even
within the deductible range where patients spend their own money.
I. NEW SERVICES FROM HDIIPS
Discussion of incipient sources of litigation must begin with a
brief overview of how HDHPs are constructed, particularly the di-
verse benefit packages and the new kinds of financial and health advi-
sory services that these plans are beginning to offer.24 In any given
HDHP, actual coverage may be comprehensive, encompassing pre-
scription drugs, a large network of providers, a panoply of services
such as physical therapy, and the like; or it may be very narrow, a
bare-bones policy covering little aside from major hospitalization; or
it may be something in between. Actual financial coverage for each
covered service can vary widely, often depending on whether the pro-
vider is in- or out-of-network, or even on the provider's quality rat-
ing.25 Although every patient has a high deductible in these plans,
23 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
24 As noted by James Robinson, "Health insurance is evolving from compre-
hensive coverage for a restricted set of choices to limited coverage for a broader set of
choices. Diverse benefit designs and increased consumer cost sharing challenge
conventional policy wisdom but may counteract some of the pernicious features of the
health care status quo." Robinson, supra note 12, at W139; see generally Jon R.
Gabel, Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas Rice, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Are
They More Than Talk Now?, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 20, 2002, at W395; Wendy K. Mari-
ner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems with Theory and Prac-
tice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 485, 503 (2004) (illustrating
the options available to consumers).
25 "Employees with customized benefits, at their most elaborate, can choose
among as many as five deductibles, five co-insurance levels, broad or narrow doctor
and hospital networks and several prescription-drug options." Sarah Rubenstein,
Buying Health Insurance, Cafeteria Style, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2004, at D4.
See generally Robinson, supra note 12.
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2008] HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS: LITIGATION HAZARDS 9
such differences loom large once that deductible has been met, and
can also influence how soon the patient reaches the deductible thresh-
old.26
A. Financial Assistance
Many plans provide financial services, such as website tools with
which enrollees can keep track of their expenditures, including check-
ing their claims history online, and making decisions about how to
invest the funds in their HSAs.27 To make it easier for members to
pay at the time of service, some HDHPs provide debit cards that di-
rectly deduct the costs from the patient's HSA.28
A number of insurers and even provider groups also have begun
helping patients find out, in advance, the cost of a proposed test or
treatment and its reasonable alternatives. After all, a major goal of
high-deductible health care is to encourage patients to consider the
economic as well as the medical wisdom of their choices. As dis-
cussed elsewhere, 29 pricing information has traditionally been proprie-
tary and convoluted, hence difficult for anyone to learn. Nonetheless,
many health plans have undertaken major efforts to bring pricing in-
formation to their enrollees, 30 even including the cheapest places to
buy medications.
31
Many plans also provide "discount networks" of providers who
offer services to plan enrollees for a discount. Often these networks
include services that are not covered by the plan, such as massages or
26 See infra, Part IV.A.
27 Zack Martin, The Plan: Drive Consumers Online, HEALTH DATA MGNT.,
June 2006, available at
http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/issues/20060601/13482-1 .htrnl.
28 Sarah Rubenstein, What Do You Owe the Doctor? Swipe a Card to Find
Out, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005,
http://online.wsj.conarticle._print/0,,SB I 12203619672493328,00.html.
29 Morreim, New Twists, supra note I at 1250, 1258 & n.244.
30 Damon Darlin, You Think 401(k)'s Are Hard to Manage? Try Health Ac-
counts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2006,, at C5, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/18/business/yourmoney/l 8money.html; Vanessa
Fuhrmans, WellPoint Aims To Get Consumers To Compare Medical-Care Costs,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2006, at A12; Bob Mook, Colo. Health Insurers Quick to Em-
brace Transparency,' DENVER Bus. J., July 6, 2007, http://www.bizjournals.com/
denver/stories/2007/07/09/story7.html?b=1183953600%5e1487201; Carol Gentry,
Humana Tool Helps Users Shop Health Care, TAMPA TRIB., July 7, 2007, at Cl,
available at http://www.tbo.com/news/money/MGBE5JlDT3F.html; Lisa Girion,
Doctors' List Puts a Price on Care: A Decision by a Major Medical Group to Post
Rates Could Push Rivals to Do the Same, Letting Californians Shop, L.A. TIMES, May
28, 2007.
31 Darlin, supra note 30.
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fitness club memberships. The discounts render those services more
affordable and thereby make the plan itself more attractive.32
B. Provider Information and Medical Assistance
Aside from such financial assistance, HDHPs also provide tools to
help enrollees make medically informed decisions. Provider selec-
tion, for instance, can be aided by quality and satisfaction ratings for
various hospitals and physicians.
Plans also help patients make specific health care decisions.
Telephone triage services are typically staffed by registered nurses
who can, through a series of questions, help the caller decide whether
his current symptoms warrant visiting a physician or perhaps even the
emergency room.33 In some cases a physician may be the one at the
other end of the line.34
Many health plans provide disease management services to help
people with chronic illnesses such as diabetes, heart failure, or
asthma, to cope effectively with their illness. Some insurers have a
system for reminding enrollees about flu shots, mammograms, and
other preventive care,35 or even offering tips on how to cut costs, such
as by splitting pills.
36
32 These services include weight-loss programs, vision care, and alternative
medicine. Michelle Andrews, Does It Pay to Manage Your Own Care? N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2004, § 3, at 7, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/18/business/yourmoney/1 8heal.html;
Robinson, supra note 12, at W146; Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 401; Gerard Brit-
ton, Discount Medical Plans and the Consumer: Health Care in a Regulatory
Blindspot, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 97, 97-98 & n.2 (2004).
33 Herrick, supra note 10, at 13; Annette M. O'Connor, Hilary A. Llewellyn-
Thomas & Ann Barry Flood, Modifying Unwarranted Variations in Health Care:
Shared Decision Making Using Patient Decision Aids, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 7, 2004, at
VAR-63, VAR-69.
3 John Wasson et al., Telephone Care as a Substitute for Routine Clinic
Follow-Up, 267 JAMA 1788 (1992) ("a clinician typically has at least 10 telephone
consultations a day.").
35 Tom Anderson, Insurers Use Personalized Statements to Improve Em-
ployee Health and Lower Costs, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, November 2005, at 24, avail-
able at http://www.benefitnews.comlasset/article/239688/insurers-use-personalized-
statements-improve-employee.html.
36 For example:
A new cost-cutting push by one of the nation's largest insurance companies
is encouraging patients to engage in a controversial tactic: cutting their drug
bills by cutting their pills in half.
UnitedHealth Group's is now offering patients a chance to lower their co-
payments by buying a pill for twice the dose they need and cutting it in half.
The program is voluntary and gives patients the opportunity to save as
much as $300 annually in copayment costs per prescription.
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Beyond that, patient decision aids can provide detailed informa-
tion and decision-trees for people facing an important choice, such as
whether to have surgery for benign prostate enlargement or which
kind of therapy to choose for cancer.37 Unlike generic health informa-
tion for a general audience, these decision aids focus on defined
groups of people and aim to assist with specific decisions.38
From this diversity of services emerge several sources of tort and
contract litigation.
II. TORT CLAIMS
Although health plans can be indirectly liable for providers' qual-
ity of care via respondeat superior or ostensible agency,39 such liabil-
Tara Parker-Pope, Health Insurers Push Pill Splitting As a Way To Save Money on
Drugs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2005, at D1.
37 See Sarah Rubenstein, Health Insurers Show Employees Graphic Surgery
Videos, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2005, at B 1. Such decision aids attempt to present
"high-quality, up-to-date information about the condition or disease stimulating the
need for a decision, the available health care options, the likely outcomes for each
option, the probabilities associated with those outcomes, and the level of scientific
uncertainty." O'Connor et al., supra note 33, at VAR-64-65. The aids also promote
values clarification discussions and guidance, helping patients better to communicate
their questions and values to providers. Id. at VAR-65.
38 These aids can also enhance physician-patient communication by provid-
ing patients with a better information base from which to ask more enlightened ques-
tions and thus, it might be hoped, help them arrive at solutions that better fit their
individual needs. Such questions might, for instance, result in inquiries of whether or
not there is a generic alternative to a costly. medication. See Sarah Rubenstein, Is
Your Doctor Really Right? Insurers' Tools Help Patients Question Doctors, WALL ST.
J. ONLINE, Jan. 26, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SBl 13742469884447596.html?mod=health hs health.providersjinsurance.
39 Ordinarily, neither a hospital nor an insurer will be liable for the actions of
independent contractors, such as physicians who typically practice in their own of-
fices and may have contracts with a variety of insurers and MCOs. However, as the
respondeat superior doctrine developed for hospitals, when the plaintiff has been
induced to believe and then relies on the belief that the physician actually is an em-
ployee of the hospital, the hospital may be liable as though it were an employer. See
Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989); Clark v. Southview Hosp. &
Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ohio 1994); Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v.
Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. 1998); James v. Ingalls Mem'l Hosp., 701
N.E.2d 207, 209 (Il1. App. Ct. 1998); Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142,
152-53 (Ind. 1999); Pamperin v. Trinity Mem'l Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Wis.
1988); Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277 (Wis. 1992).
The doctrine was then extended to health plans, applicable when the plan:
(1) held itself out as the provider of health care, without informing the
patient that the care is given by independent contractors, and (2) ...
the patient justifiably relied upon the conduct of the HMO by looking
to the HMO to provide health care services, rather than to a specific
physician.
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ity will not be spotlighted here, because the issues are likely to be the
same whether they crop up above, or below, the deductible. That is, if
a network physician performs poorly, the health plan could potentially
be vicariously liable regardless of whether the faulty service was paid
for out of pocket or covered by insurance. Accordingly, this article
will focus instead on direct liability, or corporate negligence, as it may
emerge where patients are paying out of pocket.
As applied to health plans, direct liability analysis largely
emerged from the duties ascribed to hospitals.4° In the seminal case
Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 766 (Ill. 1999).
A number of courts have been willing to find health plans liable under
ostensible agency. See, e.g., Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 188
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988); Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 855 (Fla.
2003); Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174,
177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Independence HMO, Inc., v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 987-
89 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (recognizing vitality of ostensible agency theory, but not ruling on
the underlying claim's merits); Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1040, 1044
(Ohio 1990); Elsesser v. Hosp. of Philadelphia Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 802 F.
Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1992); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147, 149-50 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (against an insurer); Paterno v. Albuerne, 855 F. Supp. 1263, 1263 (S.D.
Fla. 1994); DeArmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Jackson v.
Roseman, 878 F.Supp. 820, 822 (D. Md. 1995); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113
(D. Md. 1996); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), rev'd,
656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995); McClellan v. HMO of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1056-58 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of
Ill., Inc., 696 N.E.2d 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), afftd, 719 N.E.2d 756 (I11. 1999); Jones
v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 703 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), aff'd in part &
rev'd in part, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (I11. 2000); Negron v. Patel, 6 F. Supp. 2d. 366, 371-
72 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46,
54 (Ohio 1994); Sloan v. Metro. Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d
1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
But see Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (I11. App. Ct. 1992)
(denying claim for vicarious liability on ground that HMO did not control physi-
cians); Chase v. Indep. Practice Ass'n, 583 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991)
(finding no vicarious liability in IPA-type HMO); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp.
316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempts state tort claims based on
vicarious liability); Ramos v. Preferred Med. Plan, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1006, 1007-08
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the issue of apparent agency is a question of
material fact); See also William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Man-
aged Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 Tort & Insur. L.J. 451, 458-64 (1991).
40 William E. Milks, Annotation, Liability of Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs) for Negligence of Member Physicians, 51 A.L.R.5TH 271, 280-81
(1997) ("As a general proposition, physician malpractice claims against HMOs are
based on the same theories which support physician malpractice claims against hospi-
tals. They include direct negligence claims (for example, negligent hiring, retention,
or supervision), vicarious liability, ostensible or apparent agency, and respondeat
superior. Such claims are typically included in complaints naming one or more indi-
vidual physicians as defendants, as well."). See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty.
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Thompson v. Nason Hospital,4' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court iden-
tified several duties hospitals directly owe patients, including a duty to
"select and retain only competent physicians," and to "formulate,
adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care
for the patients. 42 Thereafter, in Shannon v. McNulty,43 a Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court extended direct duties to health plans wherever
they perform functions similar to those of hospitals." It has now be-
come quite widely accepted that health plans directly owe certain du-
ties to enrollees, such as to exercise due care in selecting, monitoring,
and retaining their physician staff.45 Courts have also identified addi-
Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (I11. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966);
Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991); McClellan v. HMO of Pa., 686
A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996); Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
4' 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
42 Id. at 707. The four duties Thompson identified are: "(1) a duty to use
reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment... ;
(2) a duty to select and retain only competent physicians . . . ; (3) a duty to oversee
all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care ... ; and (4) a
duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care
for the patients." Id. at 707; see also Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla.
1989).
4' 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
44 Id. at 835-36.
Where the HMO is providing health care services rather than merely pro-
viding money to pay for services their conduct should be subject to scru-
tiny. We see no reason why the duties applicable to hospitals should not be
equally applied to an HMO when that HMO is performing the same or simi-
lar functions as a hospital.
Id.
45 See generally Allen D. Alfred & Don L. Daniel, Upon Further Review:
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and a New Era of Managed Care Organization
Liability, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 309, 323-330 (2003); Chittenden, supra note 39, at
455-57, 468; William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed
Health Care System, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 159, 166, 173-74;
Allen D. Allred, Terry 0. Tottenham, Liability and Indemnity Issues for Integrated
Delivery Systems, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 457, 458-59 (1996); Mark A. Hall, Institu-
tional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Contain-
ment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431 (1988); David L. Trueman, Managed Care Liability
Today: Laws, Cases, Theories, and Current Issues, 33 J. Health L. 191 (2000); Peter
D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achiev-
ing Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REv. 985, 1067-68
(1998).
For cases featuring hospital and/or health plan liability, see Shannon v.
McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 415
(N.J. 1995); McClellan v. HMO Pa., 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996); Negron v Patel, 6 F.
Supp. 2d. 366, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc.,
719 N.E.2d 756 (I1. 1999); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119 (I11.
2000); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981); Simmons
v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., 533 S.E.2d 312, 322-23 (S.C. 2000); Kampmeier v. Sa-
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tional duties, such as to avoid defective design and implementation of
utilization management programs. 46
Within this realm, several possibilities arise for litigation against
health plans where the enrollee is spending his own money below the
deductible.
A. Decision Advisory and Related Health Services
Where a health plan undertakes to provide health care services,
that assistance should comport with a reasonable standard of care. As
noted above,47 those services can include direct health advice such as
telephone triage or decision aids48 to help patients make major deci-
sions. And they can include quality ratings of doctors and hospitals in
an effort to guide patients toward better providers.
Shannon49 concerned telephone triage. A pregnant woman who
believed she was in pre-term labor was unable to obtain help from her
cred Heart Hosp., No. CIV. A. 95-7816, 1996 WL 220979 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996).
But see Gafner v. Down E. Cmty. Hosp., 735 A.2d 969 (Me. 1999).
46 See Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878-80 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990); Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 670-71 (Ct. App. 1986); Long v.
Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 826-28 (Wyo. 1998); Dunn v.
Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995); McClellan v. HMO of Pa., 686 A.2d 801 (Pa.
1996); Steineke v. Share Health Plan of Neb., Inc., 518 N.W.2d 904 (Nev. 1994)
(Caporale, J., dissenting); Foster v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 969 F. Supp.
1020, 1024-25 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d
1119 (Ill. 2000). But see St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.
1997) (hospital found not liable for negligent credentialing based on explicit state
statute; because this case predated Texas' more recent statute holding health plans
potentially liable for their medical decisions, it is unclear whether this case has any
precedential value).
See also Allred & Daniel, supra note 45, at 359-61; Hall, supra note 46, at
458-59 (discussing Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211
N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965)); Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for
the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REv. 587, 601-03 (1997); Chittenden, supra note 39,
at 468-73; Sage, supra note 45, at 173-75.
In some of these cases, ERISA preempts claims for direct negligence that
might otherwise go forward (see infra Part V). See, e.g., Lancaster v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 54-56, 62-64 (D. Mass. 1997); DeArmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865
F. Supp. 816, 817-18 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp.
182, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Elsesser v. Hosp. of Philadelphia Coll. of Osteopathic
Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-92 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that ERISA preempts
claims for misrepresentation but not for ostensible agency); Altieri v. Cigna Dental
Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Conn. 1990); Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Bur-
rage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995).
47 See supra Part I.B.
48 Rubenstein, supra note 38; O'Connor et al., supra note 33, at VAR-69.
4' 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
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physician, despite multiple attempts. The only help provided by the
plan's phone triage service was to recommend that she try, again, to
contact the unresponsive physician. The situation spiraled downward,
and when Mrs. Shannon finally received care, the baby was delivered
prematurely and died two days later. 50 The court held that the plaintiff
had stated various causes of action, including direct corporate liabil-
ity.51 There could be liability for medically substandard advice, or
failure to mention important options.52
Similarly, decision aids need to be well-constructed. Ideally, the
patient should receive "high-quality, up-to-date information about the
condition or disease stimulating the need for a decision, the available
health care options, the likely outcomes for each option, the probabili-
ties associated with those outcomes, and the level of scientific uncer-
tainty."5 3 Given the constant changes in medical science, maintaining
this level of quality could pose serious challenges, as the aids would
need to be regularly updated. 4 Equally importantly, the information
'0 Id. at 832.
51 As the court described:
Where the HMO is providing health care services rather than merely pro-
viding money to pay for services their conduct should be subject to scru-
tiny. We see no reason why the duties applicable to hospitals should not be
equally applied to an HMO when that HMO is performing the same or simi-
lar functions as a hospital.... Here, HealthAmerica provided a phone ser-
vice for emergent care staffed by triage nurses. Hence, it was under a duty
to oversee that the dispensing of advice by those nurses would be performed
in a medically reasonable manner. Accordingly, we now make explicit that
which was implicit in McClellan and find that HMOs may, under the right
circumstances, be held corporately liable for a breach of any of the Thomp-
son duties which causes harm to its subscribers.
Id. at 835-36.
52 For instance, in Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc,. a patient injured
during a hysterectomy later learned that acceptable therapeutic alternatives might
have permitted her to avoid the hysterectomy entirely. 686 P.2d 285, 288 (Okla.
1984). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that when the physician fails to disclose
medically viable alternatives, the damages can include the cost of the treatment itself
as well as any complications arising there from. Id.
53 O'Connor et al., supra note 33, at VAR-64-65.
'4 Id. at VAR-67-68. O'Connor et al. note one effort to enhance the quality
of these aids. Id. at VAR-68.
[Tihe Cochrane Collaboration on Decision Aids has used six basic criteria
(called 'CREDIBLE') to rate the quality of PtDAs: C = competent
developers and development; R = recent; E = evidence-based; DI =
disclosure of conflicts of interest; BL = balanced presentation of options,
benefits, harms; and E = efficacious. A second generation of quality
standards is being developed, using an international consensus process and
key stakeholders such as developers, producers, users, and payers.
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must not be biased, for instance, by inducing patients to choose less
costly treatments. Where efforts fall short and a patient is injured by
erroneous, outdated, biased, or incomplete information, liability could
ensue for the health plan. 55 Although the undertaking may be gratui-
tous--an extra service the plan provides beyond those required under
the contract--once the patient is invited to rely on this information, it
should be provided with a reasonable level of competence. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts cautions:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to ren-
der services to another which he should recognize as neces-
sary for the protection of the other's person or things, is sub-
ject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from
his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his under-
taking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm,
or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking.56
Analogously, where plans purport to provide quality ratings of
doctors, hospitals, or other providers in an effort to steer patients to-
ward "better" care, those ratings should be founded on solid criteria
and data.57 Of interest, in July of 2007 "the New York State attorney
general's office asked a health insurance company . . . to halt its
planned introduction of a method for ranking doctors by quality of
care and cost of service, warning of legal action if it did not com-
ply."'58 The request was largely based on physician groups' concerns
that the rankings were based more on cost than quality.
59
55 For an excellent discussion of the arguments on behalf of holding health
plans potentially liable for their medical information and advice, even in ERISA
plans, see Kristin Madison, ERISA and Liability for Provision of Medical Informa-
tion, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 471 (2006).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
57 See Gabel et al., supra note 24, at W401. Many observers believe that "the
most important type of information - the quality of available providers - is not yet
adequate to meet consumer needs." Id.
58 Anthony Ramirez, Attorney General Objects to Insurer's Ranking of Doc-
tors by Cost and Quality, N.Y. TiMES, July 14, 2007, at B3.
Generally, physicians express concern that the quality ratings that alleg-
edly reflect their performance may be peppered with errors, and difficult to correct.
Ellen Nakashima, Doctors Rated but Can't Get a Second Opinion: Inaccurate Data
About Physicians' Performance Can Harm Reputations, WASH. POST, July 25, 2007,
at A01; available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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In a related scenario, at least one jury found a health plan liable
for failing to provide the case management services they promised.
As with telephone triage and other advisories, such services may be
gratuitous in the sense that they go beyond the financial support that a
health plan is first and foremost expected to provide. However, once
offered, the plan generally has a duty to deliver. In Smelik v. Mann,
when a woman died from problems associated with kidney failure, her
husband sued his wife's physicians and HMO, arguing that the HMO
did not provide the disease management programs they had promised,
and which her condition warranted.60 The case did not allege any
failure to pay for medical care, but rather a failure to provide the close
coordination and supervision of care that would be provided in a case
management program.6' Ultimately the federal district court awarded
the plaintiff $9 million in damages, 35 percent of which the jury as-
signed to Humana.62
To be sure, such jury verdicts do not create binding precedent.
However, they may foreshadow future possibilities. Though health
plans may not be obligated to provide ancillary advisory and case
management services, once again a gratuitous undertaking must
measure up to a reasonable standard of care.
B. Economic Informed Consent: Tort Injuries
Aside from the quality of their health advice, health plans might
also incur liability related to economic informed consent. There are
two scenarios: one in which the plan obstructs patients' access to pric-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/24/AR2007072402545 pf.html.
59 Id. By the end of 2007 New York's Attorney General Andrew Cuomo had
reached an agreement with major health plans regarding how they would construct
and promulgate their physician rating systems. Jilian Mincer, Doctor Ratings Re-
vised, Wall St. J., December 16, 2007; available at
http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB 119776597524732041.htrnd.html
60 Jury Finds Humana Negligent in Care of Enrollee: HMO to Pay $4.2
Million in Damages, MEALEY'S MANANAGED CARE LIABILrrY REP., July 20, 2005, at 2
[hereinafter Humana] (reporting on the jury verdict in Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-Cl-
06936 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 28, 2005)). The plaintiff and physicians reached a
confidential settlement prior to trial, but the suit against the HMO, Humana,
proceeded. Id. at 1.
61 For further discussion of Smelik, see Cameron Krier, One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back: The Impact of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila on ERISA and Patients'
Rights, 38 TEx. TECH L. REv. 127, 151-52 (2005); Linda P. McKenzie, Eligibility,
Treatment, or Something In-Between? Plaintiffs Get Creative to Get past ERISA
Preemption, 23 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 272 (2007).
62 Jury Finds Humana Negligent, supra note 60, at 2.
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ing information, and another in which the plan provides prices, but the
numbers are inaccurate.
1. Health Plan Obstructs Economic Information
Hazards under the first scenario are real but, fortunately, fading.
Elsewhere it has been argued that, under HDHPs, physicians could
potentially encounter tort liability if they fail to make certain kinds of
pricing information available.63 In the applicable scenario the patient
has, let us assume non-negligently, been injured by undergoing an
intervention that he would have refused, had the physician explained
its high financial cost.64 Where the physician's failure to disclose the
cost proximately causes the patient to accept the ill-fated procedure,
tort liability for a failure of economic informed consent is plausible,
even if not yet black-letter law.
65
Assuming that this hypothetical breach of economic informed
consent presents a viable claim for relief against a physician, health
plans might incur a similar liability by forbidding physicians to dis-
close the pricing information that patients want and need.
Historically, insurers have done just that, largely to preserve their
bargaining power with various physician groups. 66 Physicians too
have been loath to forfeit the bargaining leverage that financial se-
crecy provides.67 Thus, when patients try to find out costs, many have
63 See Morreim, New Twists, supra note 1, at 1217-25. This particularly
applies to the physician's own fees, as distinct from fees set by other providers, such
as hospitals. See id. at 1219-20.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1219-22.
66 For example:
Insurers typically put confidentiality agreements into their contracts with
medical providers, with the goal of keeping providers from getting informa-
tion that could boost their bargaining power ....
Insurers also don't want rival insurers to know about the deals they strike
with doctors, as the insurers compete with each other for business. Hospi-
tals and doctors, who may accept less from one insurer than another, also
have a stake in keeping the amounts they'll accept secret ....
Sarah Rubenstein, Patients Paying for Medical Care Struggle to Divine the Costs,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/
article~print/0,,SB I 10780138521747816,00.html.
67 "Medical providers and insurers consider [the price insurance companies
pay for procedures] to be highly sensitive competitive information, and their contracts
require that it remain secret." Judith Graham, Pricing Health Care? It's Not That
Easy, Ct. TRIB., Aug. 10, 2006, at Al.
Beyond this, physicians who discuss fees with each other could trigger antitrust scru-
tiny directed toward possible price-fixing.
Doctors also cite federal and state laws that say competing insurers and doc-
tors can't band together with their rivals to set the same prices across the
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found their efforts blocked by doctors and health plans alike.68 Where
the health plan erects the block, then the plan may share in the liabil-
ity.
69
board. Though the Federal Trade Commission doesn't say a doctor can't tell
an individual patient their negotiated rates, sharing those rates with other
physicians can sometimes lead to government scrutiny, making doctors
hesitant to talk about them with anybody, says William Jessee, a doctor and
chief executive of the Medical Group Management Association, an organi-
zation of people who manage and lead group medical practices.
Rubenstein, supra note 66.
68 Patients "are running into a roadblock: Their insurers and doctors don't tell
them the price tag for care in advance--when they can make a decision about it."
Rubenstein, supra note 66.
69 One potential legal theory on which liability might be founded is "tortious
interference with the physician-patient relationship." The concept is largely theoreti-
cal, introduced by legal scholars in response to the rising impingement by managed
care organizations (MCOs) on physicians' professional autonomy and medical judg-
ment. As noted by Professor Hall:
A novel approach to these issues is to view them through the lens of tortious
interference with advantageous relationships. This broadly articulated pri-
vate law doctrine protects against "improper" interference with any type of
existing or prospective contractual relationship. The doctrine is fully capa-
ble of activating the law's inchoate protection of individual pa-
tient/physician relationships from interference because the tort applies to
any source of interference, lay or professional, and its highly malleable
character allows it to adjust to varying degrees of interference. If a physi-
cian's judgment is dictated by orders from fellow professionals or if eco-
nomic sanctions tied to treatment regimens are too severe, "impropriety" is
the only concept the court must invoke to strike the arrangement. Thus, a
hospital or HMO that restrained a physician's medical judgment in any
manner not considered appropriate by the law could be subject to liability.
Indeed, several courts have sustained tortious interference as a legitimate
theory under which to challenge exclusions from a hospital medical staff.
Also, in non-tort contexts, courts have relied on interference principles to
police the validity of medical staff regulations such as mandatory consulta-
tion.
Hall, supra note 45, at 470-71 (citations omitted); see also Annotation, Liability in
Tort for Interference with Attorney-Client or Physician-Patient Relationship, 26
A.L.R.3d 679, 683 (1969) (stating that third parties who interfere with the physi-
cian/patient "relationship will be held liable under the general principles of the tort of
interference" (citation omitted)); David L. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today:
Laws, Cases, Theories, and Current Issues, 33 J. HEALTH L. 191,220, 230-31 (2000).
Notwithstanding fairly sparse case law, there are at least some suggestive
opinions. In Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., a health maintenance organization (HMO)
promised members that "[tihe physician has a contractual relationship with Health-
source which does not interfere with the exercise of the physician's independent
medical judgment .... 968 F.Supp. 757, 758 (D.N.H. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
In Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., a federal district court
found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action against the physician's malpractice
insurer for allegedly inducing an interruption of the physician-patient relationship, for
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Fortunately, this litigation scenario is becoming increasingly
unlikely. Not only are most insurers backing away from their former
insistence on secrecy, many are now taking the lead in providing cost
information.70 If the driving rationale for HDHPs is to inspire cost-
consciousness in health care consumers, empowering patients with
economic information is imperative.71
allegedly inducing the physician to divulge confidential information gained through
that relationship, and beyond that, severing the relationship under inappropriate pres-
sure from that insurer. 237 F. Supp. 96, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
70 Some insurers, including Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts Health Plan, now
publish on their websites the amounts they pay to doctors and hospitals for various
outpatient tests and procedures. Liz Kowalczyk, Insurers Post Prices for Medical
Care, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 2004, available at http://www.boston.com/
news/nation/articles/2004/05/29/insurers-postprices for medicalcare.
Some essentially provide the same service by providing price information,
at the time of service, as the HSA debit card is swiped. Rubenstein, supra note 28.
Several insurers provide online tools to estimate the costs patients will
pay, based on their particular insurance package, for selected procedures at various
local hospitals. These insurers include Humana, Aetna, Lumenos, and WellPoint.
Rubenstein, supra note 66; Fuhrmans, supra note 30.
Cigna now provides typical prices for certain types of doctor visits, and
lists specific price ranges for hospitals nationwide for several common admissions,
including child birth, angioplasty, and coronary bypass surgery, in addition to the
quality and efficiency rankings it already provides for these admissions. Rubenstein,
supra note 38; see Lewis Krauskopf, Cigna to Publicize Prices for Medical Proce-
dures, REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2005, available at http://gahealthplans.org/
index.php?module=pagesetter&func=viewpub&tid=3&pid=238.
In perhaps the most striking departure from the confidentiality about fees,
Aetna is making available the exact prices it pays physicians for a wide variety of
tests and procedures. It now provides this information for several cities, with plans to
do the same elsewhere in the country. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurer Reveals What
Doctors Really Charge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2005, at D1; Sarah Rubenstein, Pa-
tients Get New Tools To Price Health Care, WALL ST. J, June 13, 2006, at D1, avail-
able at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl 15016291772778539.html?mod=healthhome insid
ejtodayleftcolumn.
In another instance, a private corporation plans to collect and make pricing
information available in exchange for a modest fee. Jon Sarche, Company Details
True Cost of Health Care, INT'L Bus. TtMES, Mar. 20, 2006, available at
http://in.ibtimes.com/
articles/20060320/personal-insurance-health-savings.htm.
71 Like health plans, some governmental entities now provide or mandate
certain price disclosures. Medicare, for instance, now places on its website price
comparisons for similar brand name drugs used to treat such conditions as high blood
pressure, arthritis, high cholesterol, and the like, and publishes the common prices it
pays for certain medical procedures. See Robert Pear, Price Comparison for Drugs is
Put on Federal Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, at A18; Sarah Lueck, Prices
U.S. Pays Hospitals, Doctors To Be Publicized, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2006, at D4,
available at http://online.wsj.comn
article/SB 114230937938997488.html?mod=health_home-stories; Ceci Connolly,
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2. Health Plan Provides Inaccurate Economic Information
If the first litigation scenario is fading, a second might arise from
the converse situation, in which the plan actively provides information
about how much a proposed intervention might cost. Two kinds of
effort must be distinguished.
On one hand, the plan might simply offer a rough approximation
of, for instance, the average cost of a particular surgical procedure
within an enrollee's geographic area.72 Actual costs could vary widely
among providers, and could change even more if a particular patient
needs more or different services from those initially anticipated. 73 If
the information is provided with appropriate caveats reminding pa-
tients of such variability, liability is doubtful because the plan has not
created expectations of precision.
On the other hand, health plans may bear considerably greater ac-
countability where they purport to provide exact information. Most
commonly this might be the actual fee the plan negotiated with a par-
ticular provider for a given procedure. Importantly, this information
should not be confused with telling the patient the prices each pro-
vider charges. The provider's charge may be considerably higher than
what the health plan pays the provider, and unless that provider has
agreed to accept the health plan's reimbursement as payment in full,
the patient may be expected to pay the difference. In either event,
whether the plan purports to tell what providers charge, or more nar-
rowly what it will pay providers, the plan needs to be accurate and
Medicare Rates to Be Posted, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2006, at A17, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyncontent/article/2006/03/16/AR2006031601785.html.
California and a number of other states now mandate that hospitals make
public the "charge masters" that track list prices for all the services and products the
hospital provides. See Lucette Lagnado, Medical Markup: California Hospitals Open
Books, Showing Huge Price Differences, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al; Sarah
Rubenstein, Patients Get New Tools To Price Health Care: To Enable Comparison
Shopping, More Insurers and States Reveal The Costs of Many Procedures, WALL ST
J, June 13, 2006, at Dl, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 1 15016291772778539.html?mod=healthhomeinsidetoday_left-column;
Graham, supra note 67.
Some states are beginning to require that hospitals and surgery centers
report costs of various outpatient procedures, as well as their success rates. Christi
Parsons, State Will Post Surgery Prices: Outpatient Date to Go Online in January
'07, CHm. TRiB., June 15, 2005, at Metro 1; Graham, supra note 67.
72 Rubenstein, supra note 66; Paul B. Ginsburg & Joy M. Grossman, When
The Price Isn't Right: How Inadvertent Payment Incentives Drive Medical Care, W5
Health Affairs 376, 380 Aug. 9, 2005,
http://content.healthaffairs.orglwebexclusives/index.dtl?year=2005
73 See Martin, supra note 27.
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specific74 so that the patient can, if he wishes, choose providers or
treatments according to affordability.
In this scenario, liability could follow an error that causes harm.
If the plan provides a price figure that is too high, the patient might
forego an intervention, thinking it to be too costly, thereby incurring
harm. Conversely, if the number is significantly lower than the real-
ity, the patient might accept an intervention that harms him, one he
would not have accepted had he known the real cost.
This scenario is essentially equivalent to physicians' litigation
risk.75 The health plan may not have a duty to provide pricing infor-
mation, but any such service must be provided with reasonable care.76
If the patient is injured, and if a jury finds that a reasonable person
would have chosen differently with accurate information, then the
plan might indeed be liable in tort.7 7 As discussed below, an analo-
gous issue could arise where the question concerns the patient's pro-
gress toward meeting the deductible.78
Overall,
[a]lthough insurers are not likely to be guarantors of the in-
formation provided, courts will carefully scrutinize patients'
decisions based on reasonable reliance on the accuracy and
currency of the data. . . . If patients are expected to make
choices about the value of treatment options relative to costs,
including choosing high-quality providers, the institutions
providing data will face litigation for any harm resulting from
deficient information. Patients will have a strong claim that
they justifiably and detrimentally relied on the insurer's in-
formation.79
74 See Fuhnnans, supra note 70 (arguing that simple pricing information is
merely "a first step in bolstering healthcare consumerism").
75 See Morreim, New Twists, supra note I at 1217-25.
76 As the Thompson court quoted the Restatement 2d of Torts § 323:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his under-
taking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
Thompson, 591 A.2d at 708.
77 Morreim, New Twists, supra note 1, at1225.
78 See infra Sec. H1I.
79 Peter D. Jacobson & Michael R. Tunick, Consumer-Directed Health Care
and the Courts: Let the Buyer (and Seller) Beware, 26 HEALTH AFF. 704, 710 (2007).
[Vol. 18: 1
2008] HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS: LITIGATION HAZARDS 23
Il. CONTRACT CLAIMS
A. Errors in Financial Management
As noted above, 80 insurers offering HDHPs and HSAs often ac-
company these products with a number of financial services, such as
online tools to help members keep track of their health care bills,
claims experience, and the financial activity in their HSA accounts,
including current balance, contributions from the employer or em-
ployee to the HSA, any interest or dividends earned by the invested
HSA funds, HSA maintenance fees, and any debts to providers that
exceed available HSA funds.8' Many insurers offering HDHPs do not
actually manage the HSA money themselves, but rather contract with
major banks.82 Other HDHPs do administer their own HSAs, and
UnitedHealth acquired a bank, Exante, which will manage its HSAs.83
As health insurers become increasingly enmeshed with their
members' finances, opportunities for error arise. Some are purely
accounting errors, while others may influence patients' provider
choices, and still others carry broader financial implications.
1. Accounting Errors
A variety of accounting errors could arise in these complex finan-
cial relationships. The health plan could deduct the wrong amount
from the member's HSA, for instance, then make a refund that is
wrongly cast as a contribution to the HSA.84 This, in turn, could af-
80 See supra Part I.
81 Some of the plans that provide such services include: Definity Health,
http://www.definityhealth.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2007); Lumenos,
http://www.lumenos.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); The Chesapeake Life Ins. Co.,
http://www.healthmarket.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2007); and HealthAllies,
http://www.healthallies.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
82 Aetna, for instance, partners with J.P. Morgan, while the Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans have linked with other banks. Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 407.
83 ld.; Jonathan G. Bethely, United Offer. We'll Pay Doctors Up Front for
Patients' Share, Am. MED. NEws, Apr. 10, 2006,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/04/10/bisbO4lO.htm.
84 Sarah Rubenstein, Savings Accounts for Health Care Cause Confusion,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2004, http://online.wsj.comlarticleprint/. Richard
Kaplan offers a useful discussion of the ins and outs of HSA contributions and
management:
HSA contributions are subject, however, to an overall limitation, whether
they come from the employer or from the employee. [I.R.C. § 223(b)(4)(B)
(West 2004).] This limitation is the lesser [I.R.C. § 223(b)(2)(A), (B)] of:
(1) the annual deductible of the 'high deductible health plan' that is
associated with the HSA, [I.R.C. § 223(b)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i)] or (2) a limit that
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fect the member's allowable contributions in the future. Disagree-
ments could arise over whose job it is to correct which records. Myr-
iad problems could arise, some of them quite serious. As noted by
Professors Jost and Hall:
Because funds in HSAs can be carried over from year to year,
insurers that administer HSAs could potentially accumulate
large sums of money for which they are responsible. Most in-
surers, however, have little experience functioning as banks.
The process of managing and investing assets, receiving de-
posits, processing checks and debit card transactions, and
providing account statements may be new to them.85
Moreover, they point out, it is not clear that the usual governmen-
tal banking regulations will actually apply to a health insurer offering
such financial services.86 The only real requirement seems to be that
"the funds must be maintained in a separate account and must not be
commingled with insurer funds that are at risk. If these funds are kept
separate from the insurer's other funds, then they are not subject to,
and do not affect, the insurer's solvency and reserve requirements.
87
Clearly, the opportunities for financial error in this new setting are
abundant. And equally clearly, mismanagement could lead to litiga-
tion, whether as breach of contract, breach of warranty,88 or even
breach of fiduciary duty.
89
is adjusted annually for inflation. [I.R.C. § 223(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii),
(g)(1)(B)(i).] In 2004, that limit is $2,600 for self-only coverage and
$5,150 for family coverage. [I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269, 270
(Q&A 12).].
Kaplan, supra note 1, at 554.
85 Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 407.
86 Id. at 408.
87 id.
88 In Dunn v. Praiss the New Jersey Supreme court held, in a case concern-
ing the concurrent duties of physicians and health plans to provide medical care, that
the HMO could be liable for contribution to the physician, based on (alleged) breach
of contract by HMO in its duty to provide care to its subscribers. 656 A.2d 413, 415-
16 (N.J. 1995). The court went on to note that "[clontract law might also be utilized
to hold HMOs liable for malpractice based on breach of contract or breach of war-
ranty." Id. (citing David J. Oakley & Eileen M. Kelley, HMO Liability for Malprac-
tice of Member Physicians: The Case of IPA Model HMOs, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 624,
626 (1988)). In this case, the physician who had already been found liable for medi-
cal malpractice could rightly demand "contribution from his HMO on the basis of its
independent breach of contractual duty to a patient-subscriber of the HMO." Id. at
416.
89 In Brosted v. Unum Life Ins. Co. Am., 421 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 2005), for
instance, the plaintiff had qualified for disability insurance benefits and began receiv-
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Presumably, health plans will anticipate such eventualities with
caveats and warnings. From one website: "[t]he program and its ad-
ministrators have no liability for providing or guaranteeing service or
the quality of service rendered ... ,90 However, it remains to be seen
whether courts will agree that such warnings are sufficient to exoner-
ate plans from liability where their accounting procedures are clearly
inadequate, particularly where those warnings are inconsistent with
glowing advertisements aiming to lure subscribers to purchase this
plan with its putatively magnificent financial services.
To be sure, many of the accounting problems that arise when
health plans venture to keep track of patients' HSAs and other finan-
cial issues within these high deductible plans will be correctible, and
limited in their impact. Nevertheless, substantial sums of money are
now in the hands of insurers who, as Jost and Hall observe, may be
relatively inexperienced in these matters. 91 It remains to be seen
whether the problems will remain small and limited.
2. Economic Informed Consent: Contract Damages
Whereas Part II identified physical harms that might result from
inadequate economic informed consent, a different group of cases
arises where the harm is only financial. Consider where a health plan
says that Hospital A charges $882 for a computed tomography (CT)
scan of the head, whereas Hospital B charges $4,038.92 The patient
ing payments. However, due to a clerical miscalculation, Brosted received higher
reimbursement than he was entitled to. When the insurer subsequently reduced his
benefits to make up for prior overages, Brosted sued, inter alia, alleging breach of
fiduciary duty. Upholding the district court's summary judgment for defendant, the
Seventh Circuit held that "a breach of fiduciary duty claim premised on a misstate-
ment requires an intent to deceive." Id. at 466. In this ERISA case, the court also
observed that, "'while there is a duty to provide accurate information under ERISA,
negligence in fulfilling that duty is not actionable."' Id. (quoting Vallone v. CNA Fin.
Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 642 (7th Cir. 2004)); See also Schmidt v. Sheet Metal Workers'
Nat'l Pension Fund, 128 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty can only be valid against an individual or entity that qualifies as an
ERISA "fiduciary" and showing an unwillingness to hold fiduciaries responsible
where they provided adequate written disclosures, and did not participate in the com-
munication of misleading information).
90 HealthAllies, http://www.healthallies.coml. Health Allies is not an in-
surer, but rather is a network of discount providers. As of October 2003, HealthAllies
became part of Uniprise, which is a division of UnitedHealth Group.
http://www.healthallies.compublic/aboutlindex.jhtml91 Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 407.
92 These numbers are real. When California required hospitals publicly to
disclose their "chargemaster" rates for various procedures, it revealed the striking
differences among various hospitals' charges for common tests and treatments. A
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gets the test at A, learning too late that the price-tags were inadver-
tently reversed. Hospital A bills him $4,038. He dearly wishes he
had gone to Hospital B.
Or analogously, the health plan simply underestimates the cost of
a procedure, telling the patient it will cost $500 when in fact it is
$1500. The patient is not medically harmed by the test, but there was
no urgent need for it, as his doctor had said "watch-and-wait" would
have been medically acceptable. Had the patient known the true cost,
he would have saved his money.
In contrast to the tort discussion in Part H, in which inaccurate
price information causes the patient to select medical care that leads to
physical injury,93 here the injury is purely economic. The patient al-
leges he paid more than he would or should have, had he received an
accurate, up-front estimate. In this setting, tort claims will have no
viable foothold. The "economic loss rule," fundamental to the bound-
ary between contract and tort, holds that where injuries are purely
economic, unaccompanied by any personal injury, then the remedies
must be purely financial, and pursuant to the law of contract. 94
At that point the patient's opportunity to prevail under contract
law will depend largely on the language surrounding the plan's offer
to provide pricing information. If the plan padded its offer with cave-
ats that it does not guarantee accuracy, the patient may have a thin
reed on which to protest, particularly where he could have directly
verified the prices on his own.
On a different tack, patients may wish to dispute whether the price
was reasonable, e.g., whether Hospital B's bill for $4038 was reason-
able for a CT scan. However, these issues must generally be pursued
against the provider who actually made the charge.95
basic chest x-ray with two views ranged from $120 to $1,519; a comprehensive meta-
bolic panel ranged from $97 to $1,733; CT scan of the head (without contrast) went
from $882 to $4,038; a single tablet of Tylenol could be no charge or $7; leeches
ranged from $19 to $81 each. Lagnado, supra note 71.
93 See supra Part II.B.2.
94 Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 868 (Wash. 2007) (noting that "the pur-
pose of the economic loss rule is to bar recovery for alleged breach of tort duties
where a contractual relationship exists and the losses are economic losses. If the
economic loss rule applies, the party will be held to contract remedies, regardless of
how the plaintiff characterizes the claims"); see also Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916
A.2d 257, 265-66 (Md. 2007); Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Med.
Group, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 612-13 (Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that absent social
policy requiring resort to tort remedies, breach of contract claims cannot be recast in
tort).
95 See Morreim, New Twists, supra note 1, at 1251-59.
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Nevertheless, in cases where the patient encounters serious diffi-
culties trying to get the information on his own, or where the health
plan advertises its service to help patients learn costs ahead of making
decisions, the plan itself could potentially be liable for breach of con-
tract when it provides inaccurate pricing information that causes the
patient financial loss.
If a court finds a breach of contract, the question will then of
course center on damages. If the patient actually received a service
that was medically useful, the doctrine of unjust enrichment, or quan-
tum meruit, will block any claim that the patient should pay nothing.
Rather, the court would require that the patient pay a "reasonable" fee
for the service.96 To determine reasonableness, a court might look to
what is charged by other providers in the community, plus any factors
relevant to that particular hospital. 97 In contrast, if the patient success-
fully argues that the service was completely superfluous, or worthless,
arguably his complaint will be against the provider who recommended
and/or provided it, rather than against the insurer, who simply pro-
vided an incorrect pricing estimate.
If it is found that the patient paid too much for an otherwise medi-
cally acceptable service, the further question would address who owes
the patient the difference between the actual price and the reasonable
price. The plan will, of course, argue that the provider should be re-
sponsible for the difference, since the provider has demanded the ex-
cessive price. On the other hand, the provider can argue that it is the
plan's error that induced the patient to seek out this particular provider
and to accept this specific service. Had the plan not misled the pa-
tient, he would more likely have directly discussed prices with the
provider and either negotiated an acceptable price or foregone the
service.
While such questions are beyond the scope of this article, it
should be noted that practical realities may play a significant role.
96 In Doe v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, 46 S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tenn.
2001), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that, although the absence of a clearly set
price term between a patient and hospital rendered the contract for service void for
vagueness, the patient must pay a reasonable sum for services received. The court
identified the elements of unjust enrichment: (1) no enforceable contract; (2) the party
seeking recovery did provide goods or services; (3) the other party received them; (4)
the parties should have reasonably understood that the party providing goods/services
expected compensation; and (5) it would be unjust for a party to retain goods or
services without paying. Id.
97 Id. (citing Galloway v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995); Heartland Health Sys., Inc. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993)). For further discussion on questions about reasonableness of health care
charges, see Morreim, New Twists, at 1251-59.
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Patients may have a difficult time verifying pricing information, and
health plans may be reluctant to annoy too many of their customers by
abdicating responsibility when their advisories prove wrong. More-
over, as discussed below, a plethora of small claims suits may inspire
plans either to take considerable care to ensure the accuracy of their
information, or to provide some sort of informal guarantee that they
will absorb the extra cost if they misinform the patient. Alternatively,
plans might refrain entirely from providing price information. The
latter would indeed be unfortunate, if plans' efforts to protect them-
selves served, in the end, to remove a valuable economic information
service from the marketplace.
Yet another contract issue is likely to surface via HDHPs. To be
sure, some patients will have ample funds available, particularly if
they contribute generously to their HSAs, use few health care ser-
vices, and then watch their HSA funds roll over from year to year to
accumulate a tidy sum. However, many people with HDHPs will not
have an HSA at all, and not everyone with an HSA will be able to fill
the pot.98 As a result, providers may find that, where their services
must be paid for within the patient's deductible, they have trouble
collecting.99 One insurer, United Healthcare, has developed an an-
swer that raises distinctive issues.
B. Automatic Deductions
Historically, when patients are directly responsible for health care
bills, they often pay physicians and hospitals slowly, taking an aver-
98 "In looking at total employer contributions to HSA qualified HDHPs, we
note that 37% of employers offering HSA qualified HDHPs (covering 30% of work-
ers enrolled in these plans) do not make contributions towards the HSAs that their
workers establish. The averages that we show include the large portion of covered
workers whose employer contribution to the HSA is zero." GARY CLAXTON ET AL.,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HEADQUARTERS HEALTH RESEARCH
AND EDUCATION TRUST, 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH
BENEFITS, at 105, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/upload/7527.pdf.
"According to a report last year by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, only about 55% of people who have such accounts put any money in them."
Daniel Yi, High Deductibles a Pain for Some Insured: Cash-Strapped Consumers
Can End Up Forgoing Needed Medical Treatment or Falling into Debt, L.A. TIMES,
June 3, 2007, at Cl.
99 "Physicians may end up being unpleasantly surprised. Collecting from
HSAs may prove more difficult than they might expect. Some patients will not pay
their bills on time, even from their HSAs. Moreover, once HSAs are exhausted but
deductibles have not yet been reached, patients are on their own. Most bankruptcies
are currently driven in part by medical debt, and most persons bankrupted by medical
debt are insured." Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 417.
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age of seven months,'0° or do not pay at all. According to the Ameri-
can Hospital Association, hospitals incurred nearly $27 billion in un-
compensated care in 2004.101 In light of this pattern many providers
are concerned that, when patients must personally pay even more of
the bill than most do today, these shortfalls will grow worse, and with
them, the costs of collection and its attendant animosity.
Patients, for their part, are commonly bewildered by the flurry of
bills they receive, often multiple times from multiple providers, with
no clear indication how much they owe, or how many of these notices
are simply a statement of what has been, or might be, paid on their
behalf. 1 2
Banks and financial institutions are responding rapidly to the
emerging need for financial services as HDHPs and HSAs gain in
market share. Whereas only seven served the HSA market two years
ago, more than 600 are in the business today, including financial gi-
ants like Bank of America and J.P. Morgan Chase. 0 3 In some cases,
health plans link up with existing banks,' °4 while in other cases the
health plan literally creates its own bank. 10 5 First among the latter,
UnitedHealth Group opened a bank, Exante, and is testing a novel,
far-reaching financial service. 1°6
10o Tracey Walker, UnitedHealth Pilot Explores Credit Line/Paycheck Deduc-
tion, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE, June 2006, at 17, 17; One Bill, OnePay:
Pilot Program Simplifies Billing for Consumers and Physicians, HUB MAGAZINE,
Summer 2006, available at http://www.hubmagazine.net/articles.php?ID=106.
101 While some of this deficit is for care of the medically indigent, insured
patients incur a significant portion. Walker, supra note 100; One Bill, OnePay, supra
note 100; see also Kim Dixon, Hospitals Struggle over Who Can Afford to Pay,
REUTERS, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN0333186320070806.
102 See One Bill, One Pay, supra note 100.
103 This includes over 200 credit unions and more than 400 banks that provide
HSA management. John Carroll, Banks Give Insurers an Offer Most of Them Cannot
Refuse, MANAGED CARE MAG., July 2006,
available at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0607/0607.banks.html.
104 BlueCross & BlueShield of Tennessee, for instance, has teamed up with
Wells Fargo and First Horizon Bank. Id.
105 Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association expected to open its own bank,
Blue Healthcare Bank, in January 2007. Id.; see also Rob Roberts, Blue Cross Asso-
ciation Enters Health Care Banking, KANSAS CITY Bus. J., Feb. 13, 2007, available
at http://kansascity.bizjoumals.com/kansascity/stories/2007/02/12/dailyl7.html (not-
ing the approval of a federal savings bank charter for Blue Healthcare Bank and de-
tailing the bank's plans).
106 UnitedHealth Group, About Exante Financial Services (January, 2007),
http://www.unitedhealthgroup.conlassets/sharedlExante-Fact-Sheet.pdf; One Bill,
One Pay, supra note 100; Pamela Babcock, Medical Expenses Deducted From
Checks: Workers Out of 'Blizzard of Paperwork', H.R. MAGAZINE, June 1, 2006,
available at http://www.allbusiness.com/
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The plan, called OnePay, is completely voluntary for employers,
patients, and providers. When the patient incurs a bill, she offers her
OnePay card, whereupon the entire bill is processed, and once adjudi-
cated and approved by the insurer, is immediately paid in full, both
the insurer's and the patient's portions. Thereafter the patient receives
a monthly statement, much like a credit card statement, detailing the
charges paid and the patient's share of the bill. As with a credit card,
the patient then has 20 days to review and dispute the charges. "If a
dispute is filed, the charges are put on hold; no payment is taken or
interest charged until the dispute is resolved."l0 7 Once the individual's
charges are clear, she has the option of paying out of pocket, drawing
on her HSA, HRA, FSA, MSA or other health spending account, 10 8 or
if available funds are insufficient, drawing on a line of credit that
comes with the OnePay plan. At that point, the debt will be paid by a
moderate monthly deduction from the patient's paycheck, no more
than $60 per pay period, with interest charged at the prime rate, 7.5
percent as of the program's inception in April, 2006.
For patients who might otherwise have charged their health care
on a credit card with a much higher interest rate, this sort of arrange-
ment may be very attractive. Providers who enter the program agree
to give an additional discount, which is then split between the patient
and the employer. 1°9 However, notwithstanding the potential advan-
tages for providers, for the banks who reap fees for such services, and
even for patients who may be able to reduce the confusion of multiple
bills or high interest rates from credit cards, several contract-related
issues could arise under this arrangement.
One potential problem is that, although patients will have a 20-
day grace period in which to dispute any charges, health care and its
bills are often highly complex. Some people may not be able to un-
derstand the bill well enough to know what needs to be challenged.°
10
In any event, challenges could take several forms. Most simple is a
sector-92-public-administration/administration-human/l 181868-1.html; Bethely,
supra note 83; see Carroll, supra note 103.
107 Walker, supra note 100.
108 See Blumenthal, supra note 14, at 197-98.
109 Sarah Rubenstein, In New Health Plan, Patients Pay Their Share -- Or
Else, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at B 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 114221304342196190.html?mod=health-homeinsidetoday_leftscolumn;
One Bill, One Pay, supra note 100; Babcock, supra note 106; Bethely, supra note 83.
no At this time, it is unclear when patients will lose their right to challenge,
whether it will expire in those first twenty days or at some later point. Presumably,
this problem could be addressed in the same manner as credit card disputes, in which
problems discovered after this period are rectified with appropriate credits to patients'
accounts, where warranted.
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complete error, as where the patient did not receive the service in
question. Presumably these could be solved relatively easily by rec-
onciling bills with patient records.
More interestingly, the patient may acknowledge that she received
the service, but may want to dispute the reasonableness of the pro-
vider's prices. As noted elsewhere, this has already become a keen
focus in litigation against health care providers.' Most pertinently
here, once the bill has been paid, the patient's right to contest prices
may be foreclosed. In fact, courts are divided over whether the patient
must have already paid the bill, or conversely must not have paid, to
have standing to sue over allegedly unreasonable prices.
On one side, in Hall v Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach 12 the court
ruled that because plaintiffs had already paid the bill, they could no
longer contest the reasonableness of providers' charges." 3 Even if
there may have been elements of compulsion when patients were still
hospitalized, the plaintiffs paid the bill after the need for care ended,
hence any potential for duress no longer existed.'
1 14
On the opposite side, in Burton v. William Beaumont Hospital15 a
federal district court ruled that the plaintiffs, who refused to pay all
charges in full, could not maintain a claim for relief against the hospi-
tal for excessive and unreasonable charges. "'The rule in Michigan is
that one who first breaches a contract cannot maintain an action
against the other contracting party for his subsequent breach or failure
to perform."' 116
Thus, these diverging trends illustrate the lack of clarity on
whether the patient whose bill is already paid via a system such as
OnePay would have standing to oppose providers' charges. Under
Burton they could not raise their issue unless they have paid, but un-
111 See Morreim, New Twists, supra note 1, at 1243-51.
112 Hall v Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach, 686 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
113 In this case a group of patients filed a class action demanding partial re-
funds for items such as pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and lab services, which
they argued were excessive, unreasonable, and disproportionate to the market prices
for those same items. Id. at 655. Examples included $11.50 for one tablet of Zantac,
$52 for one Tylenol with codeine, and $20.50 for one tablet of Cipro. Id. The Florida
appellate court affirmed summary judgment on this issue. Id. at 658.
114 "By voluntarily making payment of these alleged overcharges once the
alleged coercion practiced by Humana had ceased, Plaintiffs ratified or affirmed their
prior agreement to pay these charges." Id. at 657. Two years later another Florida
appellate court applied the same reasoning to similar circumstances. Greene v.
Alachua Gen. Hosp., Inc., 705 So. 2d 953, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.-lst 1998).
115 373 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
16 Id. at 719 (quoting Flamm v. Scherer, 198 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App.
1972)).
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der Hall they could not do so unless they have not paid. Clearly, the
latter scenario raises a particularly serious question for people in a
system like OnePay. Courts could find that once the patient allows
the bill to be paid, by not disputing it during the 20-day grace period,
or indeed perhaps by voluntarily signing up for the program in the
first place," 17 then the patient voluntarily paid the provider's charges,
precisely as she agreed to in her contract with that provider." H8 Under
Hall she would have lost her standing to contest the prices.
Of note, that putative voluntariness might itself be challenged.
Even at an early pilot-testing stage, one officer from UnitedHealth
Group indicated that "'[w]e've had some employers ask us if we could
force it on an entire population."'' 9 Providers, too, could pressure
patients to accept the automatic bill-paying mechanism, simply by
closing their practices to anyone who does not accept it. If patients'
enlistment in automatic bill-paying was not genuinely voluntary,
Hall's reasoning may be less applicable.
Moreover, patients could argue that the sheer size and complexity
120
of their bills, particularly for hospitalization or other complicated
care, precludes virtually anyone but the most educated from being
able to discern the accuracy, let alone reasonableness, of the charges
within a 20-day grace period, or other limited timeframe.
If indeed litigation emerges under the theory that a OnePay type
system has precluded the patient from challenging any charges not
promptly contested, a different problem may develop. If patients be-
come locked into accepting a charge simply by not disputing it, pa-
tients may be incentivized to keep charges under dispute, just to make
sure they do not foreclose their options, or just to delay the day they
must pay. Here, contract claims may be brought by providers against
patients rather than vice versa. The prospect of such scenarios thus
highlights the point that, when payment plans such as OnePay are
brought into the market, their contractual terms must be both fair in
light of patients' marked bargaining disadvantages, and clearly dis-
closed.
117 According to the terms of the pilot program, OnePay is voluntary for pa-
tients, employers, and providers. Walker, supra note 100; One Bill, OnePay, supra
note 100; Babcock, supra note 106.
1' Hall, 686 So. 2d at 656-57.
119 Quoted comment is from Tom Policelli, senior vice president of health
care financial solutions for Uniprise, a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group. Babcock,
supra note 106.
120 See Lee Gomes, A Technology Writer Confronts Wizardry in Today's
Hospitals, WAL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2007, at BI (describing complex technology involved
in his twelve-day hospitalization for pneumonia, and appending to the article to a
copy of his fifteen-page hospital bill).
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One way or another, the well-known difficulties of collecting
from patients can be expected to generate significant controversy
where, for the first time, a substantial number of patients must pay
virtually all of their care out of pocket or HSA, where the amounts at
stake are considerably larger than at any time in the past, and where
patients will likely be scrutinizing the value, cost, and quality of their
care ever more intensely.
IV. COUNTING TOWARD THE DEDUCTIBLE
A. The Basics About Deductibles Under HDHPs
With the foregoing discussion of general tort and contract issues,
it is now possible to focus on a narrower, quite distinctive area.
Where patients are still spending out of their own pockets or HSAs,
many will want to know whether a particular expenditure will count
toward their deductibles.1
21
The question is important because patients need to know, not just
the initial price of a test or treatment, but the "bottom line" cost. Sup-
pose, for example, that Lasik eye surgery costs $3500 and the patient's
deductible is $5000. If all $3500 counts toward his deductible, then
he is only $1500 away from the point at which insurance will cover
additional health expenses. Indeed, many health plan members make
a host of such calculations toward the end of each benefits-year.
Those who have already meet the deductible for the current year may
try to fit in a variety of health care services, since those services will
be covered. Those who have not met the deductible may opt to delay
certain kinds of care, since the cost will be out of pocket. 22 The os-
tensibly simple question of whether and how much an intervention
will count toward the deductible is thus fraught with complexities.
First, the expenditure must be a covered service under the policy.
The fact that it may be an "eligible" or "qualified" medical expense
under the HSA--meaning that one can pay for it with tax-free funds--
says nothing about whether it will count toward the insurer's deducti-
121 "Consumer-directed care also raises questions about the cost of various
clinical options and whether insurers will accept medical expenses as meeting the
insurance deductible." Jacobson & Tunick, supra note 79, at 706. "[A] patient may
sue if the insurer subsequently rejects the deductible expense as not medically neces-
sary." Id. at 707.
122 Alice Dembner, High Deductibles a Healthcare Worry: The Newly In-
sured May Shun Doctors, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2007, at Al, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/03/05/high-deductibles-a-healthcar
e_worry/.
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ble.123 If Lasik is not a covered service under an individual's health
plan, no part of the fee will count toward the deductible, and the pa-
tient will still have to meet her $5000 deductable before catastrophic
coverage kicks in.' 2
Discount networks introduce comparable potential for confusion.
As noted above, 25 one of the benefits many plans now offer is the
opportunity to save on a host of health care services that are, them-
selves, outside the plan. For instance, plans may incentivize members
to use fitness facilities by providing discounts at local health clubs.
26
It would be easy, but mistaken, for patients to suppose that because
their insurer provides such opportunities, they are part of the plan's
covered benefits and that their costs will chip away at the deducti-
ble) 27
Second, even if a particular kind of service such as a diagnostic
CT scan generally qualifies as a covered benefit, it does not mean that
every CT scan of every patient will be covered. Preauthorization re-
quirements for proposed interventions, and retrospective review after
receipt of care,1 28 will still figure prominently. Medical necessity
123 Kaplan, supra note 1, at 560; Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 401.
124 Sarah Rubenstein describes a specific example:
Plans with high deductibles can leave some benefits out. In Ms. Stacey's
region, for example, one $2,500-deductible plan from LifeWise Health Plan
of Washington includes coverage for three visits to the doctor a year, even
before meeting the deductible, but it provides no coverage for prescription
drugs, preventive-care exams, maternity care or mental-health care. It also
has a separate, $5,000 deductible for services a customer gets from an out-
of-network medical provider.
Sarah Rubenstein, As Health Deductibles Increase, So Does Consumers' Confusion,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2005,
http://online.wsj.conarticle/O,,SB 1 10633529596332769,00.html?mod=healthhome
_inside-today_leftcolumn.125 See supra Part I.A.
126 Robinson, supra note 5, at 146.
127 Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 410; see generally Britton, supra note 32.
Another source of confusion within these discount networks concerns which provid-
ers are actually in the network and thus, which providers are obligated to provide a
discount. See Britton, supra note 32, at 109-10 (noting that providers are often "igno-
rant" about their status as a "network provider"); McPherson v. Shea Ear Clinic, No.
W2006-01936-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1237718, at *1-*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27,
2007) (highlighting an instance in which a consumer was presented with an unex-
pected fee from providers who were part of a discount plan).
128 It is useful to distinguish between prospective, concurrent, and retrospec-
tive utilization review. In prospective review, physicians are expected to obtain the
health plan's pre-certification to ensure payment for contemplated hospitalizations,
surgeries, or other costly interventions. In concurrent review, the health plan or re-
view entity contacts physicians caring for its hospitalized members on a regular basis
to ensure that the patient does not remain in the hospital longer than necessary, and
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"serves almost universally as the contractual touchstone of plan cov-
erage,"'129 and even in HDHPs, health plans will review claims to de-
termine whether a service is "medically necessary" 130 and thereby
covered.
Plans are ... concerned that deductibles not be exhausted too
quickly, and they continue to impose pre-approval or other
utilization review requirements in determining whether ex-
penses are covered and count against the deductible and the
out-of-pocket maximum. Therefore, providers still need to en-
sure that patients receive needed approvals before services are
rendered. 131
Indeed, the Medicare Modernization Act that created HSAs 132 ex-
pressly "permits HDHPs to impose penalties for the failure of in-
sured's to seek precertification of services and these penalties do not
count against the HDHP out-of-pocket maximum, or, presumably,
against the deductible."'' 33 As a result, if the patient failed to obtain
receives appropriate types and levels of care. In retrospective review, a payor (or an
independent reviewer with which it has contracted) decides, after care has been ren-
dered, whether it will reimburse providers. MORREIM, supra note 22, at 32.
129 CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 15 (1995); see also Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial
Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage
Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1996).
130 As Professor Hall summarizes the point, the bare fact that the health plan
has a higher deductible will not likely change the basic contractual bases for cover-
age. The same "medical necessity" reviews that ordinarily govern adjudication of
benefits will still be in place. "If the basic contractual standards of medical necessity
did not materially change under managed-care insurance, this change is certainly not
likely to happen under consumer-driven health insurance, particularly as managed-
care restrictions are loosened." Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting
What You Pay for: Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 159, 172. Professor Hall further notes:
Insurers will sometimes deny medical necessity for expenditures that are
entirely subject to the deductible even though the insurer is not obligated in
any event. This is because medical necessity still determines whether these
initial expenditures count toward the deductible each year, and the deducti-
ble determines insurers' responsibility for costs above the deductible; there-
fore, insurers retain some stake in reviewing medical necessity below the
deductible.
Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
131 Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 417.
132 See I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb04-33.pdf (discussing expenses and HDHPs in
Q&A 16, 18, and 19); I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb04-02.pdf (addressing HDHPs in Q&A 4).
133 Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 409.
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required pre-approval, an otherwise covered type of service may not
be deductible in a given instance.
Third, even if the service is covered and approved, this does not
mean that the full amount the patient paid will count toward his de-
ductible. In some cases a service may be covered only up to a certain
amount. If a plan covers $500 of physical therapy per year, for in-
stance, then even if the patient paid for $800 of physical therapy, only
$500 will count toward the deductable. 134 By the same token, plans
will not simply pay whatever a particular provider wants to charge. If
a surgeon charges $3000 for a service that the plan only considers
worth $1500, then only $1500 counts toward the deductable. Gener-
ally, if the patient's provider is within the network of preferred pro-
viders with whom the plan has contractual fee arrangements, the
amount deducted will be the contracted amount. However, if the pro-
vider is out-of-network, the plan will pay whatever it deems reason-
able for the service. 135 That amount could be substantially less than
the patient expects.
In the final analysis, patients may be headed for ugly surprises if
they do not understand the complex details of these new health plans.
"It is easy to imagine some consumers exhausting their HSAs on mis-
cellaneous expenses that do not count toward the deductible at all and
then facing the rude surprise of 'catastrophic' medical expenses once a
serious accident or illness strikes and learning that insurance coverage
is still a long way off."
136
B. Possibilities for Tort Litigation
Parallel to the discussion above, 137 one opportunity for tort litiga-
tion concerns economic informed consent. Here, the plan might erro-
neously say a service is not deductible, prompting the patient to
forego a test or treatment. She thereby suffers harm that could have
134 Rubenstein, supra note 124.
135 Id.
If your doctor is in the network, you'll get a discounted rate that's been ne-
gotiated by your insurer. For out-of-network doctors, your insurer will
likely have an amount that it's defined as 'reasonable and customary' for
your doctor to charge. Your doctor can bill you for more than what's 'rea-
sonable,' but generally only the 'reasonable' amount will count toward your
deductible.
Id.
136 Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 409-10; see also Sarah Rubenstein, Savings
Accounts for Health Care Cause Confusion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2004, at D3 (ex-
plaining the potential issues associated with HSAs, including determining how much
money is in the account, what the patient ought to pay, and avoiding tax errors).
137 See supra Parts II, III.B.
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been averted, had the plan correctly noted that the intervention was
indeed deductible. The same basic sequence could happen if, for in-
stance, the plan substantially over- or understates the deductable
amount, likewise prompting the misinformed patient to accept or
forego an intervention, to his medical detriment.
Informed consent scenarios go well beyond purely economic mis-
statements. Suppose, for instance, that a physician recommends an
MRI to evaluate lower back pain. The patient, somewhat uncertain
about whether he wants to spend the $800, asks his insurer whether
this expenditure will count toward his deductible. A plan representa-
tive reviews the patient's records and declares the scan "not medically
necessary," 1 38 hence no part of the charge would count toward the
deductable. The patient is caught in an ugly cross-fire in which his
physician says "you must" while his insurer says "it's needless." Nev-
ertheless, relieved at the prospect of saving money, the patient relies
on the plan's medical judgment and foregoes the scan. Unfortunately,
it turns out he should have gotten the MRI. He is thereby harmed as
the delay in diagnosing his problem leads to a serious deterioration in
his condition.
Obviously this scenario invites claims against the physician. Per-
haps she did not sufficiently emphasize the importance of the MRI, 139
or perhaps she should have helped the patient fight the denial.140 And
138 Indeed, many plans now require prospective utilization review of ra-
diologic diagnostics such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) or computed tomo-
graphy (CT) scans, as these procedures are among the biggest current contributors to
the rise in health care costs.
The number of imaging procedures, including traditional X-rays, is rising
by 20 percent a year, according to National Imaging Associates, a New Jer-
sey firm that provides imaging services for many health plans, including
Harvard Pilgrim and Tufts. But costs for advanced imaging techniques are
increasing by as much as 35 percent annually, according to the company.
Even though they account for a small percentage of the number of overall
imaging procedures, they account for most of the spending increase.
Jeffrey Krasner, Blue Cross to Require Preapproval for Scans: MRI, Other Imaging
Costs Up 20% in Year, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 2005, at Cl, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articies/2005/09/06/blue-cross-to-requir
e-preapproval-for-scans/.
See also David Phelps, Insurers Want 2nd Opinion Before MRI, CT Scans, STAR
TRIBUNE, January 3, 2007, http://www.startribune.com535/story/914071.html; Linda
A. Johnson, Health Insurers Limit Advanced Scans, SEATTLE TIMEs, March 24, 2008,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmil/businesstechnology/2004300975-aplimitingme
dicalscans.html.
139 Morreim, New Twists, supra note 1, at 1222-23.
'40 See id. at 1220.
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there may be room to blame the patient: it was his choice to forego a
recommended intervention to save money.'
4
'
But there might also be claims against the health plan. Where
plans undertake the medical judgments implicit in utilization review,
they may be expected to do so in a medically credible way. Some
courts note that, even where health plans ostensibly make only a de-
termination of benefits, sometimes they cannot do so without also
making medical judgments.142 And as opined by other courts, health
plans' utilization review mechanisms must be medically sound.
143
Other cases have considered whether physicians, acting as utilization
reviewers or medical directors for health plans, are acting as physi-
cians subject to review by state licensing boards,'" and whether they
can be said to have a physician-patient relationship with the person
whose care they are reviewing. 145 Moreover, at least fourteen states
141 See id. at 1226-1230.
142 Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
143 See Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 670 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that "[t]hird party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable when
medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation
of cost containment mechanisms"); Wilson v. Blue Cross Southern. Calof ., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 876, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
144 In Murphy v. Bd. Med.Exam'rs Ariz., 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1
1997), a physician engaging in utilization review ("UR") on behalf of a managed care
organization declined to authorize gallbladder surgery, pointing to the patient's prior
history of irritable bowel syndrome, her normal laboratory blood values, and the
absence of evidence for stones on ultrasound examination. The state's Board of
Medical Examiners ("BOMEX") noted that in cases like this, UR physicians' "deci-
sions could adversely affect the health of a patient", Id. at 535, and concluded that
because this UR physician had indeed practiced medicine, the Board had jurisdiction
over the quality of his practice. The Arizona appellate court agreed.
Although Dr. Murphy is not engaged in the traditional practice of medicine,
to the extent that he renders medical decisions his conduct is reviewable by
BOMEX. Here, Dr. Murphy evaluated information provided by both the
patient's primary physician and her surgeon. He disagreed with their deci-
sion that gallbladder surgery would alleviate her ongoing symptoms. S.B.'s
doctors diagnosed a medical condition and proposed a non-experimental
course of treatment. Dr. Murphy substituted his medical judgment for
theirs and determined that the surgery was 'not medically necessary.' There
is no other way to characterize Dr. Murphy's decision: it was a 'medical'
decision.
Id. at 536. But see Morris v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997).
14s A Texas appellate court held that the physician on call to authorize admis-
sions for a health plan did indeed have a physician-patient relationship with a man for
whom he refused to authorize hospitalization:
[Tlhe contracts ... show that the Humana plan brought Hand and Tavera
together just as surely as though they had met directly and entered the phy-
sician-patient relationship .... In effect, Hand had paid in advance for the
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have statutes governing liability of managed care organizations.
46
One important component in many of these, as seen for instance in the
Texas Health Care Liability Act, requires that health plans must exer-
cise ordinary care when making medical judgments.147  Case law
likewise supports the notion that, where a health plan provides con-
crete medical information or advice as part of its benefits determina-
tion process, the plan should be susceptible to liability where its in-
formation and reasoning are medically unsound.
148
In the MRI hypothetical, then, the injured patient might be able to
show duty and breach in a tort claim against the health plan, if it turns
out that the plan used medically substandard judgment in its decision
that the imaging procedure was not medically warranted, hence not
deductible. The patient would also, of course, have to prove causa-
tion, typically that had the plan made a medically credible decision,
the reasonable person would have decided differently and avoided the
injury. 149 if the denial was particularly egregious, he might addition-
ally allege bad faith breach of contract.1
5 0
services of the Humana plan doctor on duty that night, who happened to be
Tavera, and the physician-patient relationship existed. We hold that when
the health-care plan's insured shows up at a participating hospital emer-
gency room, and the plan's doctor on call is consulted about treatment or
admission, there is a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and
the insured.
Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678,679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
1' Rich & Erb, supra note 4, at 271.
147 Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), TEx. Cly. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006); see, e.g., Corporate Health Ins.,
Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000).
148 For an excellent discussion of this liability, see Madison, supra note 55.
149 For discussion of the causality element in such cases see Morreim, New
Twists, supra note 1, at 1225.
150 Mariner, supra note 24, at 527; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made
Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the In-
sured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Allred & Daniel, supra note 45, at 330-32.
At the extreme, deficiencies that spring from malice, oppression, or reckless indiffer-
ence to the rights of subscribers may constitute bad faith. See Weatherly v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994). The bad
faith doctrine first arose in insurance law, though it has also seen limited expansion
into other areas. It is predicated on the fact that in certain kinds of contracts:
[The] plaintiff seeks something more than commercial advantage or profit
from the defendant. When dealing with an inn-keeper, a common carrier, a
lawyer, a doctor or an insurer, the client/customer seeks service, security,
peace of mind, protection or some other intangible. These types of con-
tracts create special, partly noncommercial relationships, and when the pro-
vider of the service fails to provide the very item which was the implicit ob-
jective of the making of the contract, then contract damages are seldom ade-
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In one fairly predictable response to this prospect, health plans
may be reluctant to make firm determinations about deductibility,
whether by a broad caveat stating that any advance utilization review
decision is tentative, or by simply refusing to give any advance deter-
minations or opinions about which expenditures will count toward the
deductible until after the care is rendered and the plan has all pertinent
medical information at hand.' 5' If the plan refuses to provide firm
advance determinations, it can then simply point out that if the patient
decided to forego an intervention because it might not count, that was
clearly the patient's own decision.
52
quate, and the cases have generally permitted the plaintiff to maintain an ac-
tion in tort as well as in contract.
Id. at 353 (quoting Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (Neb. 1991)).
This description applies especially well to health care coverage:
[1]t is difficult to imagine a policy of insurance that is more important,
where the insured seeks maximum security and protection, than the case of
a major medical insurance policy to be used in paying for needed medical
care that is usually beyond the economic ability of most people to cover
without insurance. It is also difficult to imagine anyone who is in a weaker
bargaining position than a person in need of major medical care as com-
pared to his or her medical insurance company that has the power to deny
benefits.
Id.
Whereas litigation in contract will mainly concern substantive questions of
whether the patient was owed a particular resource and whether that re-
source was received, bad faith tort questions will mainly concern the proce-
dures by which these decisions were made. Health plans must have consid-
erable leeway in exercising the judgment that adjudication of benefits inevi-
tably involves. To show bad faith, that is, to have a cause of action for tor-
tious failure of a health plan's expertise, a plaintiff must not just show that
an alternate decision might have been justified, but that the denial of re-
sources was without any reasonable basis, and that the health plan knew, or
recklessly disregarded, this lack of a reasonable basis for denying benefits..
. Although bad faith claims originated in third-party insurance, in which
the insured is exposed to great vulnerability by depending on the insurer to
defend him against outside claims, arguably at least as much vulnerability
characterizes the patient needing health care benefits. By the time illness or
injury arises, it is too late to shop for another health plan; the plan deter-
mines what level of care will be provided, and the patient suffers potentially
major and long-lasting detriments if the plan makes the wrong decision.
E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Stan-
dard of Care, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 37 n.121 (1997).
11 "It is likely ... that such reviews will be done retrospectively, after treat-
ment, rather than requiring patients to obtain permission first. In addition, patients
will be paying for these services regardless of the outcome of the dispute, so the dis-
pute affects only the insurer's future contingent financial liability." Hall, supra note
133, at 173 (citations omitted)."
152 However, in an important twist discussed below, ERISA plans may be
compelled to provide deductible information in advance, albeit with the saving grace
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C. Possibilities for Contract Litigation
Whereas tort litigation may arise mainly where advance determi-
nations about deductibility influence medical decisions, contract liti-
gation would contest decisions made after care has been rendered.
The plan says "that wasn't a covered benefit," "that service was not
medically necessary," or "the out-of-network provider's fee was not
reasonable, and we will only deduct the amount we deem reasonable."
Thereafter, the patient may dispute the plan's decision as a breach
of contract. 53 The initial step may be to seek an independent review.
At least forty-two states and the District of Columbia have provisions
for independent review of medical necessity determinations, although
exact provisions vary considerably.154 Some states regard the inde-
pendent reviewer's opinion as merely advisory; many states require
enrollees first to exhaust the plan's internal appeals processes; while
other states refuse to review coverage denials after treatment has been
provided. 155
If independent review is unavailable, impractical, or unsatisfac-
tory the patient may then turn to contract litigation. In these types of
actions health plans should ordinarily be able to defend a clear con-
tractual exclusion quite easily, as where the plan simply does not
cover dental care, or covers physical therapy services only up to $500.
In general, where benefits determinations are made according to clear
criteria, courts tend to honor their terms. In Loyola University of Chi-
for the plan, that any errors it makes will be litigated under limited federal remedies.
See infra Part V.
153 In a similar kind of action, the plaintiff in Williams v. Tyco Electronics
Corp., No. 6:06-CV-00024, 2006 WL 2645170 (W.D.Va. Sept. 14, 2006), deposited
$1200 into a health reimbursement account, thinking he could use his 2006 contribu-
tions to cover expenses incurred in 2005. When told that 2006 money could not count
toward 2005 expenses, he asked the company to rescind his request to participate in
the plan for 2006, and to have his money refunded. The court granted summary
judgment to the defendant employer. Id. See also Tyco Electronics' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Williams v. Tyco Elec. Corp., 2006 WL
2645170 (No. 6:06-cv-00024), WL 2780029 (arguing that the plaintiff's attempt to
rescind his participation fails as a matter of law, and that the terms of the plan pre-
clude plaintiff from seeking reimbursement),
154 Linda Greenhouse, Court, 5-4, Upholds Authority of States to Protect
Patients. N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/2 1/national/21 HEAL.html.
155 See Wendy K. Mariner, Independent External Review of Health Mainte-
nance Organizations' Medical-Necessity Decisions, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2178,
2178 (2002); Michelle Andrews, Health Care Appeals Are No Snap, N.Y. TiMES, July
21, 2002, at B 11. Of note, the Supreme Court has held that even plans subject to
ERISA do not foreclose the option of seeking external review. Rush Prudential, Inc.
v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
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cago v. Humana Ins. Co., 15 6 for example, the patient failed to secure
advance approval for a heart transplant. The Seventh Circuit held:
"This is a contract case and the language of the benefit plan controls.
Again, Loyola and Mr. Via were certainly free to attempt these life-
saving procedures, but the benefits plan does not require Humana to
pay for them." 157 The court noted that "[a]s the plan unambiguously
states, no benefits are payable without prior approval. "158
In contrast, plans may be particularly vulnerable where their de-
nial of deductibility turns on medical necessity, the cornerstone of
most health insurance contracts. 159  Unfortunately for plans, the
vagueness of medial necessity provides a very weak foundation for
defending benefits decisions. The doctrine of contra proferentem is
based on the fairness principle that, since the party writing the agree-
ment had the opportunity to make the wording clear, then its failure to
do so should not work against the party who lacked this opportu-
nity.16° A number of courts have utilized this doctrine to favor plain-
tiffs where the denial of benefits was based on medical necessity.'
61
156 996 F.2d 895, 897 (7th Cir 1993).
157 Id. at 903.
158 Id. Similarly, in McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 1192,
1210 (10th Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit upheld an HMO's refusal to pay for nursing
home care for which prior UM approval had not been sought as required. "While it is
readily apparent Mr. McGee sought the best possible care for his daughter, he was
still obligated to work within the defined contractual borders of the HMO he elected
to participate in." Id. at 1207; see also Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1336 (3rd Cir.
1991); Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994); Gee v. Utah
State Ret. Bd., 842 P.2d 919, 920-21 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Harris v. Mut. of Omaha
Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1993); Arrington v. Group Hospitalization & Med.
Servs., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D.D.C. 1992); Free v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 F.
Supp. 554, 560 (D. Md. 1982); McLeroy v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Or., Inc., 825
F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (N.D. Ga. 1993); see generally E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doc-
tor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
939, 1017 (1999).
159 See supra III.A.
'60 MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE, supra note 4, at 47-49; HAVIGHURST,
supra note 129, at 182; Mariner, supra note 24, at 523.
161 In Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E. 2d 638, 643 (I11. App. Ct.
1977), for instance, the Illinois Supreme Court held that because "medically neces-
sary" was ambiguous, and contract disputes must be construed in favor of the insured,
the patient should receive coverage for inpatient removal of impacted wisdom teeth.
In McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), the California Supreme Court likewise cited contra proferentum to hold
that, in view of the ambiguities inherent in "medical necessity," immunoaugmentive
therapy for terminal lung cancer should be covered. In ex parte Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Ala., 401 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1981), the Alabama Supreme Court relied on the
same reasoning to award coverage for inpatient care of osteoporosis-related fractures,
while in Group Hospitalization, Inc. v. Levin, 305 A.2d 248, 249-50 (D.C. 1973), the
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Admittedly, even where the text of the contract is clear, courts
may still look to the "reasonable expectations" of the insured, which
in turn may be based on concepts about the purpose and processes of
health care insurance. 162 Nevertheless, given that the patient already
received care (hence is not medically desperate), that the amounts at
stake within the deductible are relatively small, and that courts are
generally willing to honor a clear contract, 163 it is reasonable to sup-
pose that judges may not strain to grant patients an effusive benefit of
doubt.164
V. ERISA
A. ERISA Basics
No discussion about health plan litigation is complete without at-
tention to ERISA, 165 the proverbial "800-pound gorilla." Here, the
"gorilla's" reach is currently somewhat limited. ERISA covers the
great majority of health plans provided through the workplace. How-
ever, as of 2005 "[m]ost enrollment in HSAs [came] from persons
purchasing coverage outside the employment context"--from private
individuals buying their own insurance--and hence would not be sub-
District of Columbia appellate court awarded inpatient care for back pain. Similarly,
a California appellate court held in Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 245 Cal. Rptr.
273 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), that when an insurer implemented a standard of medi-
cal necessity significantly different from prevailing community standards and did not
properly investigate a claim, it stood to incur liability for bad faith.
162 Mariner, supra note 24, at 529.
163 See McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 1192, 1202 (10th
Cir. 1992) (stating that "the objective in construing a health care agreement... is to
ascertain and carry out the true intention of the parties"); see also cases cited supra
note 161.
164 For example:
Although courts no longer apply rotely the principle that an insured is
bound by everything in the policy regardless of whether she read it, that re-
mains the presumption unless mistake or fraud can be shown. However,
within the particular context of health plans, more scrutiny of adhesionary
terms may be necessary to determine what can reasonably be expected, both
of patients and insurers.
Mariner, supra note 24, at 526-27.
Professor Mark Hall argues that courts may defer to insurers' medical
necessity decisions in these cases because conflicts of interest are ameliorated where
their denials of deductibility do not directly impinge on the plan's resources. Hall,
supra note 133, at 173-74.
165 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See generally 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
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ject to ERISA.166 Still, as more employers embrace the idea, we can
expect the proportion of HDHPs subject to ERISA to rise. 167
Congress passed ERISA during a prolonged economic downturn
in which employers became increasingly unable to meet their obliga-
tions to employees, particularly for pensions. Congress became
deeply "concerned that the Social Security system, itself strained by
the increasing demands made on it by retired workers, could not be
relied upon to provide adequate retirement benefits for the vast major-
ity of covered employees"' 68 if large numbers of employers simply
failed to keep their promises to fund pension plans.
Accordingly, Congress created a quid pro quo: in exchange for
requiring that pension plans be funded and vested under federal speci-
fications, all benefit plans, welfare benefits as well as pensions,,
69
were placed under a uniform set of federal rules that would ease their
administration and minimize unanticipated expenses. Companies
would no longer need to tailor their benefits to fifty different sets of
166 See Robinson, supra note 12.167 "Despite recent entry into the market, these plans are gaining popularity.
Drawing on information from major insurance carriers, William Boyles, publisher of
the Consumer Driven Market Report, estimates that enrollment in HSA-type plans or
HRAs (a forerunner to health savings accounts) more than doubled since January
2006, to 13.4 million Americans." David Gratzer, A Health-Care Bargain, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 31, 2007 at A12.
"Since HSAs first became available in 2004, more employers have begun
shifting health care costs to workers, leading to a surge in the accounts' popularity. In
late 2004, about 500,000 individuals had them; currently more than 3 million use
them." Karla Dial, New Tax Law Expands and Improves HSAs, HEALTH CARE NEWS,
Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artld=20485.
Nevertheless, the rate of increase may be difficult to predict.
The numbers of U.S. workers enrolled in such plans through their jobs (ex-
cluding dependents and those in firms with fewer than three workers) grew
only slightly, to 2.7 million in 2006 from 2.4 million in 2005, according to
the Kaiser Family Foundation. Most do it because either their companies
give them no choice or the premiums are the cheapest. Enrollment is grow-
ing faster on the individual market and among sole proprietors, but that may
be because the plans are often the only affordable option.
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health Savings Plans Start to Falter, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007,
at D1.
168 Holmes v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 706 F. Supp. 733, 735 (C.D. Cal.
1989).
169 "'Welfare benefits such as medical insurance ... are not subject to the
rather strict vesting, accrual, participation, and minimum funding requirements that
ERISA imposes on pension plans."' Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24
F.3d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d
929, 935 (5th Cir. 1993), modified, 217 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 2000); see also 29
U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
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state laws, 170 and they would not be required to provide any particular
set of benefits. But in return, a promise made must be a promise kept.
ERISA applies only to businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce,' 7' hence does not cover government workers or church em-
ployees. Aside from these limited exceptions, however, nearly all
employment-based benefit plans are governed by ERISA.
The statute has three major structural features. First, it preempts
state laws in favor of federal causes of action and remedies. ERISA
shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... ,, Thus, in health
care ERISA has largely shielded employment-based health plans from
accountability for malpractice, wrongful death, fraud, breach of con-
tract, and the panoply of state-based causes of action for which those
plans might otherwise have been liable.
1 73
Second, the "savings clause" permits states to continue to regulate
the business of insurance. 174 That is, nothing in ERISA "shall be con-
strued to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance .... Thus, for instance, a state can re-
quire all commercial insurers to provide mental health care benefits. 1
76
170 See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990)
(noting that in passing ERISA, Congress set various uniform standards); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,44 (1987); Rich & Erb, supra note 4, at 242.
171 Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 507-08 (10th Cir. 1991)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1)).
172 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000); see, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 45.
17 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000); Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 45;
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992); see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc.,
868 F. Supp. 110, 111, 116 (D. Md. 1994) (preempting state claims against an HMO
for failure to cover treatments for diplopia, chronic back pain, facial tic, severe de-
pression, and addiction to prescription pain medications); Hemphill v. Unisys Corp.,
855 F. Supp. 1225, 1229, 1232 (D. Utah 1994) (preempting various tort claims related
to insurer's failure to cover certain benefits after auto accident); Rollo v. Maxicare of
La., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 245, 246-47 (E.D. La. 1988) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)) (preempting claim against HMO for poor care after an
auto accident).
114 "ERISA explicitly 'saves' from preemption state laws that regulate insur-
ance, assuring that most issues affecting insured employee benefit plans are governed
by state rather than federal law. Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting ERISA
have emphasized the expansive state regulatory authority over insured ERISA plans."
Jost & Hall, supra note 13, at 398 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
m 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
176 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1984) (holding
that a Massachusetts statute requiring insurance companies to provide mental health
care benefits is not preempted by federal law).
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Third, ERISA's "deemer" clause provides that companies' self-
funded benefit plans shall not "be deemed to be an insurance company
or any other insurer. . . ."177 The Supreme Court has read the deemer
clause as preempting all state laws that relate to self-insured employee
benefit plans. 78
As a result, employers can provide health care--or not--as they see
fit, and can modify, including to downsize or eliminate, their benefit
plans at will. 179 The only requirement is that, if a benefit has been
promised, it must be delivered. Moreover, the ERISA fiduciaries who
177 29 U.S.C.§ 1144(b)(2)(B).
178 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990). For this reason, many
larger corporations self-fund their health plans rather than buying insurance products
from the open market. By avoiding plans encumbered with costly state-mandated
benefits, these companies can save considerably as they provide workers' health care.
See Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997) (overturning a
Maryland law that required all benefit plans, including self-funded ones, to carry stop-
loss coverage because such law was a violation of ERISA).
In 2007 the Fourth Circuit held that ERISA preempted the Maryland "Fair
Share Health Care Fund Act, which requires employers with 10,000 or more Mary-
land employees to spend at least 8% of their total payrolls on employees' health insur-
ance costs or pay the amount their spending fails short to the State of Maryland."
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007). The court
noted that ERISA "does not mandate that employers provide specific employee bene-
fits but leaves them free, "for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate
welfare plans." Id. at 190 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.
73, 78 (1995)).
One exception is Hawaii, which enacted legislation mandating employers
provide health insurance in 1974. See Sylvia A. Law, Health Care in Hawai'i: An
Agenda for Research and Reform, 26 AMER. J.L. & MED. 205, 206-15 (2000)
(discussing a program that has an exemption from ERISA); John C. Lewin and Peter
A. Sybinsky, HAWAII'S EMPLOYER MANDATE AND rrs CONTRIBUTION TO UNIVERSAL
ACCESS, 269 JAMA 2538 (1993).
179 Employers can design their welfare benefit plans, including health care,
however they wish, and can change them virtually at will so long as they satisfy cer-
tain requirements, such as notification. Indeed, the ERISA statute and case law are
quite emphatic that employers must not be required to provide any particular level or
kind of benefits. "'Nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee bene-
fit plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide if
they choose to have such a plan."' Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226-27 (2000)
(citing Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996)). "ERISA does not
mandate that employers provide any particular benefits .... ." Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). "In general, welfare benefits are not subject to
vesting requirements under ERISA, 29 U.S.C.§ 1501 (1). Employers may adopt,
modify or terminate welfare benefit plans." Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d
1326, 1330 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.
73, 78 (1995)). See also McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, (5th Cir. 1991)
cert. denied 506 U.S. 981 (1992) (holding that employers can change benefits at will,
so long as the change does not intentionally discriminate against any particular
group).
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administer these plans are accorded considerable discretion as they
engage in the difficult balancing between the interests of any individ-
ual, versus those of the plan members as a whole. 80 ERISA provides
that so long as an ERISA fiduciary's benefits decisions are not arbi-
trary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion, they should generally
be enforced, even when the decision may not be the most reasonable
interpretation of the plan.
18
As a consequence, most litigation surrounding ERISA plans fo-
cuses on the way the plan and its benefits are being administered, and
on whether the issue is preempted to federal courts.1
82
180 The statute and the Supreme Court define the ERISA fiduciary function-
ally, "as one who 'exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control re-
specting management of [a] plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets."' Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)); See also Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S.248, 262 (1993); Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220
(2004).
More particularly, "a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the
extent [(1)] he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan. .. [or (2)] he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21)(A) (2000).
The fiduciary has the difficult task of balancing the interests of all the
beneficiaries who depend on him to administer the plan in their interests. And when
he errs, he is "personally liable for damages .... for restitution .... and for ... [equi-
table relief as the court sees fit]." Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2066
(1993); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 516-20 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
For further discussion see generally E. Haavi Morreim, Benefits Decisions
in ERISA Plans: Diminishing Deference to Fiduciaries, and an Emerging Problem
for Provider-Sponsored Organizations, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 511 (1998) (hereinafter
Morriem, Benefits Decisions in ERISA); E. Haavi Morreim, Another ERISA Twist:
The Mysterious Case of Pegram and the Missing Fiduciary, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 235
(2002) [hereinafter Morreim, Another ERISA Twist].
181 For example:
It must be remembered that the decisions of plan administrators are entitled
to deference because the plan administrators are fiduciaries charged with
the responsibility to make decisions critical to the lives of individual citi-
zens. To a very real degree they are on the front line in determining the ex-
tent and the quality of health care being delivered in this country. They
have the duty to assure that the financial integrity of health plans is pre-
served by denying improper claims, however difficult such decisions may
be. In doing so they assist in placing restraints upon health care providers
who, if left to their own devices, might well permit health care costs to con-
tinue to spiral upward. However, that said, plan administrators have a duty
to assure that valid claims of beneficiaries who are in need of medical care
are not denied simply because of the cost of such care.
Adelson v. GTE Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (D. Md. 1992).
182 ERISA jurisprudence represents a formidable body of work. See generally
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Causes of action and remedies for breaches of duty are strictly
limited under federal law. Per ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), a participant or
beneficiary may bring civil action "to recover benefits due to him
under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan .... , Remedies include the monetary value of the wrongly
denied benefit, attorney fees when warranted, and certain forms of
injunctive and other equitable relief. 84 Thus, in health care cases, the
patient can win an injunction requiring the plan to cover a treatment,
or retrospectively, the monetary value of the health services denied,
but not much more. The plaintiff cannot claim damages even for very
Rich & Erb, supra note 4, at 250-61 (explaining the varied legal interpretations of
ERISA since its enactment); Jost & Hall, supra note 13; F. Christopher Wethly, New
York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.:
Vicarious Liability Malpractice Claims Against Managed Care Organizations Escap-
ing ERISA's Grasp, 37 B.C. L. REv. 813 (1996); Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 45;
Milks, supra note 40, at 279-96 (explaining that most claims against HMOs are sub-
ject to a pre-emption challenge under ERISA); Jeffrey A. Brauch, ERISA at 25-and
Its Most Persistent Problem, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 285, 289-90 (2000); Kathy L. Cer-
minara, Protecting Participants in and Beneficiaries of ERISA-Governed Managed
Health Care Plans, 29 U. MEM. L. REv. 317 (1999); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last
Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of
Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996); George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracon-
tractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 611 (1994);
Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-lnsured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole
Deserves Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 89 (2005); Thomas R.
McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law Liability
for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REv. 1 (2001); Dana M. Muir, Fiduci-
ary Status As an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law. 2 U.
Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 391 (2000); Scott D. Pomfret, Emerging Theories of Liability
for Utilization Review Under ERISA Health Plans, 34 Tort & Ins. L.J. 131 (1998);
Jeffrey Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in ERISA Health Plans,
77 N.C. L. Rev. 731 (1999); Jeffrey W. Stempel & Nadia von Magdenko, Doctors,
HMOs, ERISA, and the Public Interest After Pegram v. Herdrich, 36 TORT & INS. L.J.
687 (2001); Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Inten-
tions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under
ERISA, 31 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 29 (1999); Morriem, Benefits Decisions in ERISA, supra
note 180; Morreim, Another ERISA Twist, supra note 180; E. Haavi Morreim, ERISA
Takes a Drubbing: Rush Prudential and Its Implications for Health Care, 38 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 933 (2003); MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE, supra note 4,
at 160-83.
'83 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
184 Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S.Ct. 2063 (1993); Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d
757, 760 (8th Cir. 1992).
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grave medical consequences of a wrongful denial, for pain and suffer-
ing, or any other state-based remedy. 15
185 Indeed, some courts have openly lamented ERISA's dearth of remedies for
serious harms. As expressed by the Fifth Circuit:
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the Corcorans have no
remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake. This is
troubling for several reasons. First, it eliminates an important check on the
thousands of medical decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization
review system. With liability rules generally inapplicable, there is theoreti-
cally less deterrence of substandard medical decision making. Moreover, if
the cost of compliance with a standard of care (reflected either in the cost of
prevention or the cost of paying judgments) need not be factored into utili-
zation review companies' cost of doing business, bad medical judgments
will end up being cost-free to the plans that rely on these companies to con-
tain medical costs. ERISA plans, in turn, will have one less incentive to
seek out the companies that can deliver both high quality services and rea-
sonable prices.
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir. 1992) (footnote
omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
Other courts have echoed the point.
The Court is not unmindful this holding leaves plaintiff with no remedy un-
der ERISA for the needless and tragic loss she has suffered. ... Neverthe-
less, the Court must respect Congress' intent to have the civil enforcement
mechanism of ERISA be the exclusive remedy for such claims. ... "There is
sound reason to alter ERISA in order to provide relief to plaintiffs who pre-
sent claims like this one; however, amending ERISA to accommodate those
causes of action is for Congress, not the courts.
Huss v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 400, 408 (D.Del. 1998).
"This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for
Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the modern health
care system." Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass.
1997) (citation omitted).
Although ERISA provides a remedy for the improper denial of benefits-it is
not the remedy that plaintiffs desire. Plaintiffs misconstrue the nature of
ERISA preemption. That ERISA does not provide the full range of reme-
dies available under state law in no way undermines ERISA preemption.
'he policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely under-
mined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain
remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA..'
Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
"Although forcing the Basts to assert their claims only under ERISA may
leave them without a viable remedy, this is an unfortunate consequence of the com-
promise Congress made in drafting ERISA." Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150
F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 1998).
"ERISA preempts all causes of action that attempt to recover for a denial
of benefits. This may seem [a] harsh result in this case, but it is an unfortunate con-
sequence of the breadth of ERISA's preemption clause." Foster v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Mich., 969 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
See also Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th
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One other recent development should be noted. With the emer-
gence of HSAs under the MMA, 18 6 the Department of Labor has indi-
cated that an HSA--the tax-protected fund that can be used for quali-
fied health care expenses--is not, itself, an ERISA plan, so long as it is
completely voluntary and the employer exerts no control over it.,
87
The ruling makes sense since, after all, an HSA isn't a "plan" at all,
but simply a pot of money. 88 The plan, in this case, is the HDHP to
which the HSA is attached.189
With this background it is possible to review the assorted poten-
tial claims in tort and contract, discussed above, to discern what im-
pact ERISA might have on each.
Cir. 1996); Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 953 F. Supp 419, 424 (D. Mass
1997), affd, 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997); Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., 77
F.3d 1270, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 519 U.S. 816 (1996); Nealy v. U.S.
Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Olson v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
186 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066,2469 (2003).
187 Robert J. Doyle, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Field Assistance Bulletin 2004-1
(Apr. 7, (2004), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab_2004-1.html; see also U.S. Dept.
of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, Field Assistance Bulletin No.
2006-02; Health Savings Accounts - ERISA Qs & As (Oct. 27, 2006); Jost & Hall,
supra note 13, at 402. See also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180,
196 (4th Cir. 2007).
188 As noted by the Supreme Court, a benefit plan is "a scheme decided upon
in advance." Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000). The Court explained,
"Here the scheme comprises a set of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and
provide for their enforcement. Rules governing collection of premiums, definition of
benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements over entitlement to
services are the sorts of provisions that constitute a plan." Id. It is an "agreement
between an HMO and an employer who pays the premiums [that] may, as here, pro-
vide elements of a plan by setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled
to care." Id.
189 The ERISA statute defines a benefit plan broadly as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which ... was established or is maintained for
the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through
the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services ....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
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B. Tort Claims
1. Direct Liability
The foregoing discussion' 9° identified two particularly likely areas
of direct liability for HDHPs, namely, direct health care services, such
as phone triage and disease management, and economic informed
consent.
a. Direct Health Care Services
In Pegram v. Herdrich,19' the Supreme Court held that whereas
"pure eligibility" determinations 92 will be preempted, "treatment de-
cisions'" 93 are not. Arguably, when plans provide direct medical ad-
vice, such as telephone triage, disease management, or patient deci-
sion aids that simply help patients to make better-informed medical
decisions, state-based tort claims will likely go forward. These ser-
vices do not involve decisions about which benefits the plan will pro-
vide or pay for, and indeed in some cases they may not strictly be a
part of the formal plan at all, but simply some helpful lagniappes the
plan offers to attract buyers. 194 Moreover, they most closely resemble
the "treatment decisions" that Pegram indicated are not subject to
ERISA.1 95
190 See supra Part lI.A-B.
191 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
192 These are decisions that "turn on the plan's coverage of a particular condi-
tion or medical procedure for its treatment." Id. at 228. The Court also described
"mixed" decisions, found where the treating physician, acting on behalf of the HMO,
essentially makes benefit determinations via medical decisions about which care (not)
to provide for the patient-enrollee. Id. at 228-30. As discussed below, in Davila the
Court emphasized that "mixed" decisions are only found in this very narrow context.
See infra Part V.C-D.
193 The Court defines "treatment decisions" as "choices about how to go about
diagnosing and treating a patient's condition." Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
194 As noted above, the "plan" is a set of rules defining the benefits to which
an enrollee is entitled, plus procedures for submitting claims, etc. Id. at 223; see
supra notes 191-92.
195 More broadly, Professor Kristin Madison proposes distinguishing between
benefits decisions and the medical information on which they are based. Madison,
supra note 55, at 502-31. While the benefits should remain preempted, Madison
argues that deficiencies in the quality of the information should not. Id. Patients,
after all, increasingly utilize a variety of sources of medical information, beyond their
physicians, to make health care decisions. Id. And where plans' misinformation
causes harm, it should be subject to liability. Id. at 522.
In reply it might be argued that, in cases where benefits have been denied
on the basis of ill-informed medical necessity judgments, it may be difficult to tease
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The issue rises to the next level--from medical information and
advisory to actual health care services--in Smelik v Mann.196 Here, the
plaintiffs wife allegedly died because the health plan failed to provide
its promised case management. The federal district court determined
that ERISA did not preempt the case because, per the plaintiffs attor-
ney, "'[t]his [was] not a denial-of-benefits case. This [was] a misman-
agement-of-managed care [case].' In Smelik, the plaintiff did not al-
lege that Humana failed to pay for his wife's medical treatment, but
instead argued the [sic] Humana was negligent in the coordination and
supervision of her care." 1
97
However, the validity of such reasoning is debatable. Although
providing substandard medical information is not a denial of benefits,
here we find a failure to provide a promised service. If the insurer
expressly stipulates that it will provide case management services as
one of its enumerated benefits, then fails to deliver, appellate courts
may deem this a failure to provide the benefits due, and find that
ERISA preempts the case. A health plan's failure to provide its own
direct service is just as much a denial of benefits as is a failure to au-
thorize, or to pay for a physician or hospital to provide a service.
On this reasoning, if an HDHP wishes to maximize its ERISA
protection, it will enumerate services like case management as a part
of its benefit plan. ERISA defines a "benefit plan" as
a scheme decided upon in advance .... a set of rules that de-
fine the rights of a beneficiary and provide for their enforce-
ment. Rules governing collection of premiums, definition of
benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagree-
ments over entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions
that constitute a plan. 198
Where a service is encompassed in the plan, litigation over any
failure to deliver that service will be preempted.
out the harms caused by the denial from the harms caused by the patient's reliance on
the (mis)information underlying the denial. Nevertheless, surely there are clear cases
in which a health plan's medical information directly causes harm. As illustrated
above, a plan's determination that an MRI is not deductible because it is not medically
necessary can place the patient in the difficult position of deciding whether to believe
his doctor or his health plan. See supra Part IV.B. Yet here, the denial of deductibil-
ity does not directly deny the medical service at all, or even financial access to it.
Accordingly, it would appear to be a prime example of liability for substandard in-
formation, quite outside the ambit of ERISA.
196 See supra Part H1.A; Humana, supra note 60, at 1-2.
197 Krier, supra note 61, at 152 (citation omitted).
198 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000).
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In contrast, where a health plan is purchased by an individual on
the open market, hence not operating under ERISA, that plan might
wish to contract in the opposite direction. If a direct service such as
case management is expressly promised, then not delivered, breach of
contract would be an obvious claim. If it was never contractually
promised, but rather provided only as a gratuitous extra, then it is
more difficult to complain of breach. Thus, ERISA introduces distinct
quirks into the health care market, in that "name every benefit" ap-
pears preferable for an insurer's ERISA plans, while limiting express
promises may be better for the insurer in the individual market.
b. Economic Informed Consent
As discussed,199 tort claims for breach of economic informed con-
sent could arise either when a health plan forbids physicians to pro-
vide pricing information, or when the plan itself provides inaccurate
information, proximately causing an injury. ERISA may well affect
these two scenarios rather differently.
ERISA is likely to preempt cases where the health plan forbids
physicians from providing pricing information. Such policy decisions
are arguably a function of health plan administration, as the plan over-
sees the delivery of benefits to enrollees. ERISA generally preempts
health plan administration issues.20°
199 See supra Part ll.B.
200 Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2001);
Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343, 348 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding state law
claims that directly or indirectly concern the administration of the benefit plan are
preempted); In re Estate of Frappier, 678 So. 2d 884, 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Santitoro v. Evans, 935 F.Supp. 733, 736 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Haas v. Group Health
Plan, Inc., 875 F.Supp. 544, 548 (S.D.Ill. 1994); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859
F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F.Supp 820, 821/825
(D.Md. 1995); DeArmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Fla. 1994);
Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (E.D. Va. 1997);
United Healthcare Ins. Co. v. Levy, 114 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Kuhl
v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 20677 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
See also N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1995) (noting that ERISA pre-empts "state
laws that mandated employee benefit structures or their administration"). Different
states could apply different standards for what constitutes a negligent precertification
training or supervisory practice. This in turn could affect how defendants carry out
their claims assessment duties, by requiring different administrative procedures in
different jurisdictions. The preemption clause was designed to avoid precisely such a
result. See FMC Corp. v Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (holding that preemption is
used to avoid "patchwork" regulation and inefficient benefit programs).
See also Hinterlong v. Baldwin, 720 N.E.2d 315, 321-22 (111. App. Ct.
1999):
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The latter scenario, in which the plan provides inaccurate pricing
information, poses more interesting questions. On one hand, although
providing price information is not an adjudication of benefits, courts
might deem it an administrative service provided by the plan, hence
preempted. If the plan actually makes this information an express
plan benefit, it will again probably be preempted by the federal law.
On the other hand, if pricing estimates are not a listed plan bene-
fit, but rather an ancillary service,2 ' the plan may well be subject to
state-based tort claims. Given this possibility, ERISA-governed
health plans might be well-advised to describe pricing information as
an explicit service of the plan, thereby bringing it within the scope of
ERISA preemption. Note that here, too, just as above, this recom-
mendation would not necessarily apply to a non-ERISA plan. For
plans outside ERISA's reach, tort liability for pricing errors remains a
real possibility. If the tort risks of inaccurate information loom too
large, plans may opt to avoid providing that service--an unfortunate
outcome, given patients' fairly urgent need for this information.0 2
In enacting ERISA, Congress found that 'the soundness and stability of
plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be en-
dangered' (29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994)) due to a lack of uniformity in the
regulations of such plans....
Congress's intent in engrafting section 514(a) on ERISA was to establish
regulation of the administration of employee benefit plans as an exclusively
federal concern.... In Travelers, the Court noted that the purpose of sec-
tion 514(a) is to ensure that benefit plans are subjected to a uniform body of
law that minimizes the administrative and financial burden of complying
with conflicting directives among states or between states and the federal
government. (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1995)).
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (D.N.J. 1999):
It is axiomatic that if a participant in a plan subject to ERISA is suing an
HMO based upon the improper processing of a claim under that plan, the
claim is completely preempted by federal law .... It follows, therefore, that
a claim for negligent delay in the utilization review, or pre-authorization
process, even if alleged as a state law violation against the physician,
would, at the very least, 'relate to' an ERISA plan and, thus, be preempted.
If a participant is challenging the quality of care he or she received from the
physician, however, that claim is not preempted. (citation omitted))
affd in part & vacated in part, Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266 (3d
Cir. 2001).
201 See supra Part V.B.I.a.
202 While the "safer" option for the plan may be to abjure such a service, it
would do so at the cost of denying patients important information. Hence, contracts
with enrollees will need clear and explicit caveats about the possibility that final costs
may differ significantly from advance estimates.
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2. Indirect Liability
Courts differ widely as to whether ERISA preempts tort suits to
hold health plans liable for providers' malpractice, whether via re-
spondeat superior for the plan's own employees or via ostensible
agency for independent contractors.0 3  Some federal courts have
found that plans can indeed be liable under state law for physicians'
quality of care,2 4 while others hold that ERISA preempts such
suits. 20 5 Extensive exploration will be foregone here, as that has been
done by others. 2°
The Supreme Court's most recent ruling in this general area rein-
forced the power and reach of ERISA's preemption. As the Court
observed in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, "Congress' intent to make
the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism exclusive would be under-
mined if state causes of action that supplement the ERISA § 502(a)
remedies were permitted, even if the elements of the state cause of
action did not precisely duplicate the elements of an ERISA claim."
20 7
Accordingly, unless the plaintiff can clearly show that the claim he
makes has no connection with a benefits determination or with ad-
ministration of the plan, the claim is likely to be preempted.
C. Contract Claims
ERISA preempts state-based contract as well as tort claims. Con-
tract claims might address whether the enrollee has been granted the
right kind and amount of benefits, or whether the plan has been prop-
erly administered.20 8 Where the cause of action concerns decision
203 See supra at Part II; see also supra note 39.
204 See Dukes v. United States Healthcare Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995);
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), over-
ruled in part by Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Pacifi-
care of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995); Villazon v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 851 (Fla. 2003); see Kearney v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that courts are
split on whether a claim based on ostensible agency is preempted by ERISA, which
implies that such a claim exists).
205 See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir.
1996); Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1991).
206 See generally Wethly, supra note 182; Rich & Erb, supra note 4, at 250-
61; Milks, supra note 40; Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Reallocating
Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 20 (2000)
(discussing the implications of assigning vicarious liability to MCOs).
207 Davila, 542 U.S. at 216.
208 See DeArmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Fla. 1994);
Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
HEALTH MATRIX
about whether or not to cover a particular benefit, it will fit squarely
within the "benefits determinations" shielded by ERISA.
A much more interesting question concerns cases in which the in-
surer provides financial services for the patient's HSA. If there are
financial errors in managing the HSA, an inaccurate posting of the
patient's expenses, or bungling of an automatic deduction from the
worker's payroll, the pivotal question will be whether these services
are expressly part of the benefit plan, or simply "extra" services the
plan provides. If the former, they will likely be preempted.
However, where such financial services are not expressly part of
the benefit plan, as with the OnePay pilot project that arranges for
extra financing to pay for care,2 9 errors might well be addressed in
state courts. Because ERISA's goal is to foster uniform administration
of health plans,210 and because ex hypothesi this service is not an in-
trinsic part of the plan, the implication may be that errors in this realm
lie beyond ERISA's reach. Once again, plans that are ERISA-
governed may find it attractive to preserve the shield by expressly
making these services part of the plan.
D. Counting Toward the Deductible
1. Possibilities for Tort Litigation
a. "No, That Won't Be Deductible"
As noted, 1' tort claims regarding deductibility are most likely
where the plan announces in advance that a particular product or ser-
vice will not be deductible because it is not medically necessary. At
first blush such claims might seem to escape preemption on the
ground that determinations of medical necessity appear to be medical
rather than benefits decisions, hence subject to state-based tort litiga-
tion. However, a closer look reveals otherwise.
Courts have wrestled with the issue. Corcoran v. United Health-
care, Inc.212 concerned a case in which the health plan determined that
209 See supra Part III.B.
210 "The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause was to avoid a multiplicity of
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee bene-
fit plans. Thus, ERISA pre-empts state laws that mandate employee benefit structures
or their administration as well as those that provide alternate enforcement mecha-
nisms." N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995).
211 See supra Part IV.B.
212 Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
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hospital care was not medically necessary for a high-risk pregnancy,
opting instead to approve limited home nursing services. The Fifth
Circuit held:
Ultimately, we conclude that United makes medical deci-
sions-indeed, United gives medical advice-but it does so in
the context of making a determination about the availability
of benefits under the plan. Accordingly, we hold that the
Louisiana tort action asserted by the Corcorans for the wrong-
ful death of their child allegedly resulting from United's erro-
neous medical decision is pre-empted by ERISA.213
The Supreme Court subsequently endorsed this view in Davila,
finding that "a benefit determination is part and parcel of the ordinary
fiduciary responsibilities connected to the administration of a plan....
The fact that a benefits determination is infused with medical judg-
ments does not alter this result. ' ,214 Thus, where a plan appeals to
medical necessity to deny the deductibility of a proposed intervention,
the health plan's decision will likely be preempted to federal courts,
even if the decision causes harm to the patient.
Some observers might point out that, particularly for such a costly
thing as health care, a denial of assured payment often means the pa-
denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
213 Id. at 1331. See Cicio v. John Does 1-8, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. N.Y.
2004). But see Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa. 1998).
214 Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004). In reaching this
conclusion the Court clarified important misconceptions about its earlier opinion in
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). In that case the Court distinguished
among pure eligibility decisions, treatment decisions, and "mixed" decisions that rely
on "medical judgments in order to make plan coverage determinations." Pegram v.
Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 212 (2000). The Court ruled that where the plan is comprise
of physician-owners who make benefits decisions in the context of providing medical
care, such mixed decisions are not the decisions of an ERISA fiduciary, hence not
subject to allegations of breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 231-32.
From this it may be tempting to conclude that, where a health plan makes a
"mixed" decision that invokes "medical necessity" to determine whether a medical
intervention will count toward the patient's deductible, the decision will not count as a
benefits determination. If so, then it seems any injuries caused by a medically un-
sound decision, as where someone foregoes care because the plan has said the inter-
vention is not medically necessary, would not to be preempted. Indeed, this is pre-
cisely what the Fifth Circuit--the same court as in Corcoran--found it must conclude
in Davila's case. Davila, 542 U.S. at 221.
The Supreme Court, however, said that "Pegram cannot be read so
broadly" because that case featured a health plan in which the physicians actually
owned the plan, even as they directly treated patients. id. at 218. "The plaintiffs
treating physician was also the very person charged with administering plaintiffs
benefits; it was she who decided whether certain treatments were covered." Id.
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tient will not receive care.215  The Court, unmoved, emphasized in
Davila that "[ulpon the denial of benefits, [the patients] could have
paid for the treatment themselves and then sought reimbursement
through a § 502(a)(1)(B) action, or sought a preliminary injunc-
tion.'2
16
215 Several courts have acknowledged the close connection between funding
and the availability of care. One court took "judicial notice that, due to the high cost
of major medical treatment, individuals who obtain such treatment typically depend
upon insurance of some kind to cover much if not most of the bill. In the current
health-care market, absent pre-claim verification of insurance coverage, patients may
be forced to leave a hospital without receiving medical treatment--even though they
are insured for the medical services they seek to obtain--because they lack other suffi-
cient financial resources to pay the costs of treatment." Mimbs v. Commercial Life
Ins. Co., 832 F. Supp. 354, 358 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (citation omitted) (holding a health
plan had incorrectly stated, in prospective UR, that the proposed care would not be
covered).
In Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Insurance Co., 957 P.2d 823, 827
(Wyo. 1998), the Wyoming Supreme Court noted:
Although the attending physician is the ultimate decision-maker regarding a
patient's treatment, it is, as commentators note, naive to assume that a pro-
vider's determination that recommended care is not medically necessary,
and therefore not covered by insurance or the health plan, will not affect the
treatment ultimately received by the patient.
Other courts have likewise "recognized the 'commercial realities' facing
third-party providers of health care services, noting that in situations in which it is not
clear whether a patient is covered by a health insurance plan, 'the provider wants to
know if payment reasonably can be expected. Thus, one of the first steps in accepting
a patient for treatment is to determine a financial source for the cost of care to be
provided."' Cypress Fairbanks Med. Ctr. v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 110 F.3d
280, 283 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904
F.2d at 246 (5th Cir '90)).
In Varol v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826, 831 (E.D. Mich.
1989), the court noted that psychiatrists agreed to a utilization review program that
gave an insurer 'the right to have significant and, perhaps, dominant influence in
deciding what shall be accepted as the correct diagnosis and the proper treatment."'
The court disagreed with the psychiatrists, however, that this constituted unlicensed
practice of medicine.
"Because lack of coverage frequently translates, at least as a practical
matter, to lack of access to care, prospective and concurrent utilization review can
expose a health plan to liability claims of a kind from which indemnity plans are
largely insulated." Robert J. Conrad, Jr., & Patrick D. Seiter, Health Plan Liability in
the Age of Managed Care, 62 DE. COUNS. J. 191, 191 (1995); see also Morris v. D.C.
Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d 364, 367 (D.C. 1997) (quoting the Board of Medicine, "'[I]f
health insurance is not available, a procedure very well might not be performed."').
216 542 U.S. at 211; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53-
54 (1987).
Courts have been willing to grant preliminary injunctions in a number of
cases. See, e.g., DiDomenico v. Employers Coop. Indus. Trust, 676 F.Supp. 903, 908
(N.D. Ind. 1987); Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Va., 866 F.Supp. 277, 283
(E.D.Va. 1994); Calhoun v. Complete Health Care, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1494, 1501
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In sum, whether the patient chooses to accept or to forego care on
the basis of an advance estimate of costs, or a declaration that the cost
will not count toward the deductible, the consequences apparently are
his own. In either case, ERISA preempts.
b. "We Won't Tell You Whether It's Deductible"
Health plans may be reluctant to declare, up front, whether a par-
ticular service will be deductible and, if so, how much of the cost will
count toward the deductable. After all, adequate information may not
be readily available, and if they err, the patient may sue for the result-
ing harms. It may be far easier simply to refuse to make any advance
determinations.
ERISA could override such reluctance. ERISA expressly permits
any plan participant or beneficiary "to clarify his rights to future bene-
fits under the terms of the plan. ''21 7 Accordingly, if the plan refuses to
say whether or what amount of the care will count toward deductible,
the patient can take the question to federal court and demand a clarifi-
cation of his rights.
Below the deductible threshold, the dollar awards would be rela-
tively small, but ERISA plan enrollees still have the right to know this
information. Although it is unlikely that many patients would actually
sue for an answer, just a few determined people could pursue the mat-
ter vigorously enough to get health plans' attention. Plans would then
find themselves forced to assemble a considerably more effective ap-
paratus than many presently have in order to answer those questions
in a timely fashion. Given that ERISA plans can avoid facing tort
claims where their estimates err, such added accounting responsibili-
ties may be a relatively small price to pay, to help patients make eco-
nomically informed decisions.
(S.D. Ala. 1994), aftd, 61 F.3d 31 (1 th Cir. 1995); Leonhardt v. Holden Bus. Forms
Co., 828 F. Supp. 657, 672 (D. Minn. 1993); McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp.
633, 640, 644 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Pittman ex rel. Pope v. Secretary, Fla. Dept. Health &
Rehab. Servs., 998 F.2d 887 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (no ERISA); Henderson v. Bodine
Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir 1995); Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130
F.3d 293, 295-97 (7th Cir. 1997).
But see Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., Inc., 114 F.3d 9 (2nd Cir.
1997); McLeroy v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Or., Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1064, 1070
(N.D. Ga. 1993).
217 ERISA provides that a plan beneficiary can bring suit "to recover benefits
due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan . 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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2. Possibilities for Contract Litigation
As the plan determines whether and how much an intervention
will count toward the patient's deductible, the process will be an eligi-
bility decision. Although ERISA preempts state-based contract
claims, it does permit suits resembling contract litigation, because the
beneficiary can file suit to recover benefits due and to enforce his
rights under the plan.21 8
In these suits, parallel to the discussion above,21 9 plans are likely
to prevail where their decisions flow from contractual clarity, as
Davila220 illustrates. In Davilla's two consolidated cases, health plans
in both instances had denied benefits on the basis of fairly explicit
criteria. In the first case Juan Davila requested the drug Vioxx. The
health plan refused, referring to its "step-therapy" program in which
the patient must try less costly medications before the plan will ap-
prove costlier ones.221 Davila did not appeal or contest the decision,
whereupon the health plan refused to approve the Vioxx. 222 In the
other case Ruby Calad underwent surgery, and although her physician
recommended a longer stay, "a CIGNA discharge nurse determined
that Calad did not meet the plan's criteria for a continued hospital
stay. ''223  In both cases the Court refers to fairly explicit procedures
and criteria that the plans required as prerequisites to the requested
treatment.
Reciprocally, patients may fare better where the plan bases its de-
terminations on vague concepts like medical necessity.224 However,
218 See id.
219 See supra Part IV.C.
220 542 U.S. 200.
22 1 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 8-9, Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542
U.S. 200 (2004) (No. 02-1845), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and
Briefs (Cong. Info. Serv.).
222 Davila, 542 U.S. at 205.
223 id.
224 See supra Part 1V.C.
A case in point concerns a welter of ERISA suits brought during the 1990s
after health plans denied prospective approval for treatments such as high-dose che-
motherapy ("HDC") with autologous bone marrow transplant ("ABMT') or periph-
eral stem-cell transplant ("PSCT'). Courts were deeply divided. Some courts readily
latched onto any ambiguity they could find to authorize the treatment. See, e.g., Bai-
ley v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 866 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 67 F.3d 53
(4th Cir. 1995). Other courts pointed to health plan terms such as "experimental" and
found that because there was little or no scientific evidence favoring the treatment, the
plan's denial was not an abuse of discretion.
See also Harris v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, of Mo., 995 F.2d 877 (8th Cir.
1993); Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 807-08 (8th Cir. 1993);
Calhoun v. Complete Health Care, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D. Ala. 1994), affd, 61
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any such advantage is limited under ERISA. Courts must generally
treat the decisions of ERISA fiduciaries with deference. They recog-
nize that the fiduciary has the difficult task of balancing the interests
of all the beneficiaries who depend on him to administer the plan in
their interests. "Accordingly, '[a] trustee may be given power to con-
strue disputed or doubtful terms, and in such circumstances the trus-
tee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable.', 225 Generally,
courts will only second-guess the fiduciary if a denial of benefits is
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or fraught with con-
flict of interest.
CONCLUSIONS
Several summary points emerge from the foregoing discussion.
In non-ERISA plans, where patients are spending under the deducti-
ble, health plans could be subject to several potentially high-dollar
litigation in several scenarios, such as:
*the plan provides medically inept advice through phone triage,
decision aids, or other such services;
*the plan has a medically unsound basis for determining in ad-
vance that a proposed intervention would not be medically necessary,
hence not deductible, and the patient then foregoes care to his detri-
ment;
*the plan provides inaccurate price estimates that, in turn, prompt
the patient to make a medically untoward treatment choice;
*the plan errs while directly managing patients' HSA funds, or
while providing collection services on behalf of providers.
The opportunities for such suits are significantly larger than else-
where in health insurance, simply because the majority of HDHPs
currently are purchased by individuals outside the employment con-
226text, and hence beyond the reach of ERISA.
Within ERISA, health plans will enjoy their usual shield from
state-based litigation. However, even these plans may experience
some surprises. They may be forced to determine, in advance and
with specificity, whether a variety of proposed services will be de-
F.3d 31 (11 th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 791 F.
Supp. 309 (D.D.C. 1992), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Pirozzi v.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
By the same token, various courts affirm that clear contractual language
will prevail. See, e.g., Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir.
1994); Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1993); Arrington v.
Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1992).
225 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989).
226 Robinson, supra note 13; see supra Part IV.A.
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ductible. And it is unclear whether errors in pricing information will
enjoy the protection of preemption.
Although HDHPs will likely pose some significant challenges for
health plans within patients' deductible range, the story is not finished.
Perhaps the most striking feature of these suits will be that most will
involve such small sums. Except for torts claims that follow breaches
of economic informed consent or medically inept advice, these suits
will all focus on out-of-pocket expenses, the maximum of which
would be around $10,000 in a family plan. 227 For an ordinary person's
budget this is, of course, a substantial sum. But in the greater scheme
of health care, such figures are minute. More importantly for patients
who wish to bring a claim, the sums are so small that few attorneys
are likely to be willing to take such suits on a contingency payment
basis.
Nevertheless, some litigation can be expected. In Williams v.
Tyco Electronics Corp.,228 the plaintiff deposited $1200 into a health
reimbursement account, thinking he could use his 2006 contributions
to cover expenses incurred in 2005. When he was told that 2006
money could not count toward 2005 expenses, Williams requested
recission of his enrollment in the plan for 2006 and a refund of his
money. 229 Williams initially brought the suit in state court but, invok-
ing ERISA, Tyco promptly removed it to federal court230 where they
moved for and received summary judgment.23'
Just as this $1200 suit ultimately had its day in federal court, it is
possible to imagine many such suits. 232 Though the amounts are small
in the broader scheme of societal health care costs, they loom large for
individuals. And just as this was filed in the plaintiffs local trial
227 I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(19), 106(d), 223(a)-(b), 3231(e)(11), 3306(b)(18) (West
2005).
228 No. 6:06-CV-00024, 2006 WL 2645170 (W.D.Va. Sept. 14, 2006).
229 Id. See also Tyco Electronics' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 153, at 2.
230 Williams, 2006 WL 2645170, at *1.
231 id. at *3. The court found that the Summary Plan Description clearly
stated that the funds could not be used for expenses incurred during the year prior to
the effective date of the plan. Id. at *2-*3.
232 Another example of a small-damages suit is McPherson v. Shea Ear
Clinic, No. W2006-01936-COA-R3-CV - Filed April 27, 2007 (Tenn. App. 2007).
The plaintiff was uninsured, but had joined "Care Entree," a discount network. When
McPherson sought care for his hearing impairment he consulted network administra-
tors and concluded that his physician was part of the network. When the physician
billed a considerably higher charge than the fee McPherson expected, he sued. By the
time Shea Clinic won summary judgment because the pro se plaintiff presented little
or no evidence to support his claims, the case nevertheless had gone to the Tennessee
appeals court twice. Id. at *2.
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233court, other such plaintiffs can likewise begin in the most conven-
ient, least costly place, even if they must then move to federal court.2 4
Indeed, Williams appeared pro se in his suit.235 When people are
highly conscious of how much they spend, we can expect to see con-
siderably more of this small litigation than heretofore.
Of somewhat greater concern to health plans is the potential for
class action litigation. It is one thing for a health plan to determine
that some particular health care expense will not count toward this or
that patient's deductible. However, if a pattern of unfair denials sur-
faces, to the detriment of enrollees and the financial advantage of the
plan, a collective action could ensue.
Admittedly, in 2005 Congress curtailed opportunities for such
suits via the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.236 Per that legislation,
"class-action suits seeking more than $5 million would move to fed-
eral court if fewer than a third of the plaintiffs were from the same
state as the primary defendant. If the primary defendant and more than
a third of the plaintiffs were from the same state, the case could still
be heard in state court.' 237 Nevertheless, determined groups of plain-
tiffs could still bring such suits either by heading for federal court, or
by bringing several suits that apportion plaintiffs to keep the suits in
state courts. Such actions have already been filed on behalf of indi-
gent patients who are billed high charges for hospital and emergency
room care.2 38 By analogy, a class action against HDHPs might try to
233 Williams v. Tyco Electronics Corp., No. 6:06-CV-00024, 2006 WL
2645170, at *1 (W.D.Va. Sept. 14, 2006).
234 In Majid v. Stubblefield, 589 N.E.2d 1045, 1046 (II1. App. Ct. 1992), for
instance, a physician sought payment of $250 by filing a small claims complaint. The
patient responded by arguing that the physician's fees were "excessive and
unreasonable." Id.
235 Williams v. Tyco Electronics Corp., No. 6:06-CV-00024, 2006 WL
2645170, at *1 (W.D.Va. Sept. 14, 2006).
236 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
237 William Branigin, Congress Changes Class Action Rules, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlarticles/A32674-2005Feb 17.html.
238 A broad series of class action suits has been filed on behalf of indigent
patients, alleging inter alia that hospitals charge unreasonable prices. These suits
have not seen resounding success. See, e.g., Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp.,
382 F. Supp. 2d 562, 566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated in part, 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir.
2006); In re Not-For-Profit Hospitals/Uninsured Patients, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1354
(J.P.M.L. 2004); Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 343 F.Supp. 2d 1074 (N.D. Ala.
2004); DiCarlo v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. CV-05-1665 (DRD-SDW), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49000 (D.N.J. July 19, 2006); Rockford Mem'l Hosp. v. Havrilesko, 858
N.E.2d 56 (11. App. Ct. 2006); Hudson v. Cent. Ga. Health Servs., No. 5:04CV301
(DF), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2613 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2005); Morrell v. Wellstar
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allege, for instance, that one or more health plans systematically de-
nied deductible expenses in order to minimize the extent of catastro-
phic coverage their plans' must cover.
Assuredly it is important for health plans to be accountable for the
quality of what they do. However, if health plans find too much liti-
gation snapping at their efforts to help patients make medically and
economically informed decisions, they may simply stop providing
important services such as phone triage, decision aids, price informa-
tion, and the other assistance that patients truly need as they try to
make intelligent decisions while paying substantial amounts out of
their own pockets. It is thus to be hoped that the ideal does not be-
come the enemy of the good.
Health Sys., Inc., 633 S.E.2d 68 (Ga.App. 2006); Harrison v. Christus St. Patrick
Hosp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 648 (W.D. La. 2006); Woodrum v. Integris Health, Inc., No.
CIV-05-1224-HE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5189 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 2007).
The litigation has not been completely unsuccessful, however. At least
one court has found that identifying "reasonable charges" for a hospital requires more
than just reference to the hospital's standard billing rates. Colomar v. Mercy Hosp.
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2006); see also Urquhart v. Manatee Mem'l
Hosp., No. 8:06-cv-1418-T-17-EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17531 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
13, 2007).
Additionally, a number of these suits have settled privately. See, e.g.,
David Phelps, Uninsured Patients May Get Discounts, NIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE
BUSINESS NEWS, Mar. 17, 2007,
http://www.romingerlegal.com/newsviewer.php?ppa=8oplo-[lqmnsrmRVgb!
6%3C"bfem!; Victoria Colliver, Settlement Reached in Sutter Lawsuit, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 4, 2006, at Cl; Julie Appleby, 'Hospital-Based' Clinics Can
Charge More, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2006, at B3.
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